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TAx NEUTRALITY AND TAX AMENITIES

by
DavidHasen

ABSTRACT

Efforts to identify and implement an appropriate tax neutrality
benchmark have been persistent themes in scholarly and policy debates on
international taxation for fifty years. This paper questions whether the
concept of tax neutrality has been adequately specified for analyzing the
efficiency properties of international tax systems. As distinct from the
closed-economy setting, in the open-economy setting, neither tax revenues
received nor the burdens that tax revenues pay for may be taken as fixed.
Because tax revenues finance infrastructure and other productivity-enhancing
goods -

so-called "tax amenities" -

and because

capital burdens

infrastructure, the reallocation of tax revenues among jurisdictions and the
movement of assets and productive capacities across borders cause the
amount of tax revenue collected in each jurisdiction to diverge from the
revenue target. A consequence is that what are viewed as tax incentive
effects, or distortions, improve productivity in some cases. Neutrality as a
value, however, rests on the idea that tax incentive effects reduce efficiency
by causing resources to be allocated away from some optimum non-taxaffected baseline; this idea is what justifies referring to tax-influenced
allocations as distortions. An implication is that the baseline is not well
specified in the open-economy setting.
This article suggests that, in light of these considerations and of the
difficulty in implementing a theoretically satisfactory specification of
neutrality, an analysis focusing on the allocative, distributive, and
competitive properties of international tax rules would be more helpful than
* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. I thank Reuven AviYonah, Jim Hines, Mitchell Kane, Ed Kleinbard, Susie Morse, Fadi Shaheen, Joel
Slemrod, Bill Sundstrom, participants at various colloquia, and the editors of the
Florida Tax Review. Santa Clara University Law School provided research support
for this article. I remain solely responsible for any errors.
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one focused on their neutrality properties. A simple model relating tax
revenue and population to productivity is offered.
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INTRODUCTION

Few policy goals loom larger in the economic analysis of
international taxation than the promotion of tax neutrality, or the idea that tax
considerations should not drive the economic decisions of private actors
engaged, or potentially engaged, in cross-border activity.' Talk of neutrality
animates official policy discourse,2 while scholarly literature on the subject
has become something of a cottage industry.3 Many papers are devoted to
promoting a particular conception of neutrality over one or more rival
conceptions;4 others develop or test various empirical claims about
neutrality.5 It is safe to say that the disagreements are substantive and the
debates robust.6
Operating as part of the background consensus to these debates is the
assumption that the idea of tax neutrality has been adequately specified to
provide a framework for analysis. This paper questions that assumption. The
public finance model in which the concept of tax neutrality originally was
developed applies to the closed-economy setting and assumes that taxes
represent a pure cost. In that setting, it is possible to formulate the concept of
a non-tax-affected world with sufficient rigor (not to say accuracy) to specify
a baseline of apparently non-tax-distorted economic activity. The baseline, in
turn, serves as the yardstick by which one can measure the distorting effects
of taxes. As explained below, a centerpiece of the framework is the
assumption that one may take levels of tax-financed infrastructure and other

I . Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 64 Tax L.
Rev. 99, 100 (2011) [hereinafter Knoll, Int'l. Tax Neutrality].
2. See, eg., Hearing on the Impact of International Tax Reform on U.S.
Competitiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the
Comm. of Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of R. Glenn Hubbard,
Dean and Russell L. Carson Professor of Finance and Economics, Columbia
Business School, New York, New York).
3. See Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture The Rising TaxElectivity of U.S. CorporateResidence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 385 (2011) [hereinafter
Shaviro, Tax-Electivity] (noting that the neutrality issue "has been the dominant

question explored and debated in [international tax policy] literature for more than
fifty years"). A Westlaw search returned 212 results for articles in law journals
having the terms "international" and "tax neutrality" in the same sentence. A JSTOR
search of the same terms in economics journals returned 100 results.
4. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New
Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 937 (2004)
[hereinafter Desai & Hines, Old Rules].
5. Id. at 946-50 (citing studies).
6. See, e.g., Knoll, Int'l Tax Neutrality,supra note 1.

2012]

Tax Neutrality and Tax Amenities

61

tax-financed goods that contribute to productivity - "tax amenities," as I
refer to them - as exogenously given.
The model for the closed-economy setting is ill-suited to a regime of
open economies. In such a regime, the problem of non-neutrality arises
because any system of rules for taxing cross-border arrangements induces
flows of capital, labor, or both across national boundaries and affects patterns
of ownership as well.8 It is well understood that these reactions affect the
productivity, both of the assets that are somehow shifted in response to the
rules and of all factors of production to the extent the relative supplies of and
demands for them are shifted through the first effect. But these responses
have a third consequence as well: They alter the supply of and demand for
tax revenue in every jurisdiction that is a part of the regime. Because of the
relationship over the long term between tax revenues and the supply of tax
amenities, tax incentives circle back to alter the rates of return that function
as baselines to start with, thereby upending their status as baselines.
Expressed in the terms of the standard model, it no longer becomes
reasonable either to suppose that funding for tax amenities is exogenously
fixed or, as a consequence, to indulge the fiction that taxes represent a pure
cost.
Several conclusions follow. First, it is not clear that the concepts of
tax neutrality and tax distortion as they have been formulated are particularly
meaningful in the international setting. If no neutral baseline has been
articulated, it would seem difficult to justify normative claims about the
value of minimizing actual departures, that is, "distortions," from whatever is
taken as the baseline. Second, any effort to model the neutrality properties of
tax rules for capital flows or ownership patterns must account for the
relationship between the provision of tax-financed amenities and the
productive capacity of factors of production. (Similar problems would apply
to the analysis of tax-induced individual migration, but, following most of
the literature, 9 I assume that individual migration is much less sensitive to
tax rules, and I therefore disregard it.) It is not sufficient to account merely
for the effects of tax rules on the supply of and demand for either capital or
its owners in any given jurisdiction, taking pre-tax rates of return as given.
7. See Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on
International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543 (2001) [hereinafter Roin,
Competition], for an explanation of the standard model.
8. See Knoll, Int'l Tax Neutrality, supra note 1, for a statement of the basic
neutrality problem.
9. See, e.g., Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82
N.Y.U. L. REv. 443, 493 (2007) (noting that few Americans change residence in
response to tax rates). To the extent labor location is sensitive to taxes, the effects
analyzed in this paper would be compounded. See Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures
and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1540 (2009), for an extension of
neutrality analysis to labor as a tax-sensitive factor of production.
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Third, to the extent the benefit-purchasing character of taxes plays a role in
productivity, worries about tax distortions likely are overstated because
higher tax burdens will be correlated with (to be sure, not on a one-to-one
basis) higher pre-tax returns. And finally, it seems that a more useful mode
of analysis either would begin with a concept of neutrality adequate to the
task or, if no such concept is in the offing, would downplay considerations of
neutrality in favor of a focus on other significant properties of tax regimes,
informed by an idea of how tax revenues affect productivity.
These points are developed as follows. Part II briefly reviews the
traditional framing of the problem of tax distortions in cross-border
investment; readers familiar with the literature on international tax neutrality
can skip this discussion. Part III describes the standard model of tax
neutrality as developed in the closed-economy setting and argues that its
extension to the open-economy setting is problematic because of the effects
on productivity of shifting allocations of resources and tax revenues that
arise as tax revenues and economic activity move across borders. Subpart C
of Part III goes on to describe what a theoretically accurate account of
neutrality would look like but suggests that a workable model would be
difficult to apply. Part IV offers, instead, a simple model of the relationship
between taxation and productivity that attempts to capture the basic
intuitions supporting the criticism of the standard model. Part V examines
the likely productivity consequences of various tax regimes in light of the
model developed in Part IV.
II. THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION
Tax non-neutrality in the international setting arises from the fact
that at least two jurisdictions plausibly lay claim to tax income earned from
cross-border arrangements: the jurisdiction of the place of investment (the
"source" or "host") and the jurisdiction where its owner resides (the
"residence" or "home"). By contrast, in the domestic setting there is
generally only one plausible candidate to assess tax, as source and residence
(host and home) are identical.
Recognizing the magnitude of the bias toward domestic investment
that would result if both home and host jurisdictions exercised their full
prerogatives to tax, states have regularly sought to alleviate the high tax
burden that otherwise would fall on cross-border income. 10 The general
solution has been for residence states to cede all or a portion of their taxing
power, whether by treaty, unilateral action, or a combination of the two, so
that the total rate faced by a taxpayer in the cross-border setting

10. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A
Proposalfor Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1301, 1305-07 (1996).
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approximates the rate of one of the two states involved.II Where the effort is
successful, exactly one tax (or an amount of tax exactly equal to the tax
imposed by one of the states on its residents' domestic income) applies to all
income, whether earned domestically or abroad. Thus, so-called "double
taxation" is eliminated.
The widely-recognized difficulty with these solutions is that they
only partially address the problem of non-neutrality, which persists because:
(a) the location of capital, the quantity in which capital is supplied, and, in
more recent treatments, the identity of capital owners, all are somewhat
elastic to taxes; (b) different jurisdictions impose different rates of tax; and
(c) different jurisdictions adopt different methods of double-tax relief.12 In
particular, because capital or its owner may seek the lowest possible tax,
locational or ownership decisions continue to be driven by tax
considerations, even though one or the other of the decisions may be taxneutral. The question then becomes which type of neutrality is least
distorting over all. 13
A.

The Basic Problem

To illustrate these points, consider the following three-stage analysis
as applied to a simple system consisting of two states, State A and State B, in
which a resident of State A has $100 to invest. Assume in the first stage that
no taxes apply. If the State A resident has an investment opportunity that is
expected to yield 9 percent if made in State A, but 10 percent if made in
State B, the economically efficient decision is for the resident to make the
investment in State B. Because no taxes apply, the State A resident realizes
$10 of income after one year, and total wealth has concomitantly increased
by $10. (In a dynamic model, investors from both states would continue to
favor investment in State B until the return there converged with the return in
State A, but for present purposes it is sufficient to use a static model.14)
Now, in the second stage, assume the same situation except that
State A adopts a 35 percent rate of tax for all of the income of its residents as
well as for income produced domestically by non-residents, and State B
11. See generally Adam H. Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52
WM. & MARY L. REv. 923 (2010) [hereinafter Rosenzweig, Tax Havens].
12. Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Taxing
International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and
Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REv. 261, 272 n.36 (2001) [hereinafter Graetz,
Taxing Int'l Income].
13. See Desai & Hines, Old Rules, supra note 4, at 955-57, for an example
of this type of analysis.
14. See, e.g., Fadi Shaheen, InternationalTax Neutrality: Reconsiderations,
27 VA. TAX REv. 203, 215-17 (2007) [hereinafter Shaheen, Reconsiderations].
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adopts a 25 percent rate on an analogous basis. In the absence of any relief
for double taxation, a resident of either state will face a tax rate at the level
imposed solely based on its residence for purely domestic investments, but a
rate equal to the sum of the two states' rates, or 60 percent, for cross-border
investments. (It is possible that a state would treat foreign taxes paid as a
deductible business expense, but deductibility would merely alleviate the
disparity between domestic and cross-border investment, not eliminate it. For
the sake of simplicity, I omit discussion of the deduction model here.)
Accordingly, even though the pre-tax yield and therefore total wealth is
greater if the State A resident makes the investment in State B, the State A
resident will make the investment domestically because the after-tax yield in
State A is greater: 5.85 percent versus 4 percent. Without relief from
double taxation, after one year, $9 of total wealth will be produced instead of
$10, meaning that $1 of "deadweight loss" arises in the system. Again,
although it can be expected that after-tax rates of return will equalize over
time as capital investment responds to tax rates, the resulting allocations of
capital and labor will be inefficient, or "distorted," when compared with the
allocations that would result in the absence of taxes, taking as a given in the
latter case that tax revenues would be provided for in some fashion. 16
As described above, the general solution to this problem is either to
eliminate one level of tax or to eliminate an amount of tax equal to that
imposed by one of the states. Thus, consider in a third stage two common
alternative methods for achieving a single rate of tax: providing residents a
credit against their domestic tax liability for foreign income taxes paid (a
"foreign tax credit," or "FTC"), and exempting residents' foreign-source
income, loss, and expense from domestic tax entirely. As the following
discussion makes clear, under either method, the problem of non-neutrality is
alleviated but not eliminated. More generally, under any solution to the
problem of double taxation where tax rates differ across jurisdictions, nonneutrality arises across some margin of possible taxpayer behavior.
1. First Variation: Worldwide Taxation with an Unlimited FTC

To see how tax distortions persist, assume in the first variation that
both states tax the income earned in the state but that residence states provide
an unlimited FTC to their residents for foreign income taxes paid. This
model is generally referred to as residency-based worldwide taxation.18
Under the residency-based model, foreign taxes paid by the state's residents
15. After-tax yields were computed as follows: 5.85 percent is 9 percent
reduced by 35 percent, and 4 percent is 10 percent reduced by 60 percent.
16. See, e.g., Knoll, Int'l Tax Neutrality, supra note 1, at 104.
17. Graetz, Taxing Int'l Income, supra note 12, at 272 n.36.
18. Knoll, Int'l Tax Neutrality, supra note 1, at 101.
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reduce domestic tax liability on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Further, since, in
this case, the credit is "unlimited," the resident's tax rate is fixed regardless
of the rate in the source state, because the resident state will reimburse its
resident any excess of foreign taxes paid over domestic taxes due. Such an
excess arises when the average tax rate in the source jurisdiction exceeds the
average rate in the residence jurisdiction.
In this setting, the problem of double taxation is eliminated in the
sense that each individual pays the same domestic rate of tax regardless of
where the investment is made. Moreover, taking as fixed both the quantity of
capital available to invest and the identities of the owners of capital, tax
neutrality is preserved because the FTC regime eliminates the only
remaining tax-based incentive, which is to adjust the location of the
investment in response to taxes. (The incentive to change owner location
persists, but, as explained below, it does not appear that any efficiency losses
flow from changes in owners' locations.) That is, the resident of State A will
face a 35 percent rate of tax whether the investment is made in State A or in
State B: if in State A, State B has no basis to tax and the rate is 35 percent; if
in State B, the State A resident pays a 25 percent tax to State B and receives
a credit in the same amount to be applied against State A's 35 percent tax,
leaving a 10 percent tax to be collected by State A, for a total tax of 35
percent. Analogous treatment will apply to an investor situated in State B,
who will face a 25 percent rate no matter where the investment is made. (If it
is made in State A, the State B investor pays $3.50 in tax but gets $1.00 from
State B.) An unlimited foreign tax credit system thus results in neutrality
over the location of capital investment. Under these assumptions, $10 of
wealth is created after one year, just as in the non-tax world, but $3.50 in net
tax revenue is collected if the investor resides in State A ($2.50 to State A
and $1.00 to State B), and $2.50 if in State B ($3.50 to State A and -$1.00 to
State B). This type of neutrality is referred to as capital export neutrality
("CEN") because it removes tax considerations from the decision whether to
export capital or invest it at home.19 CEN is also sometimes referred to as
production neutrality to reflect the idea that the allocation of investment
capital is based on pre-tax returns worldwide, meaning that the worldwide
distribution and resulting productivity of capital are unaffected by taxes. 20
Universal residence-based taxation also preserves so-called capital
ownership neutrality ("CON"), a benchmark recently introduced into the
legal literature by Mihir Desai and James Hines.21 A tax system preserves
19. James R. Hines Jr., Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income, 62
TAx L. REV. 269, 272 (2009) [hereinafter Hines, Reconsidering].
20. Id.

21. Desai & Hines, Old Rules, supra note 4. They also have introduced the
cognate benchmark of national ownership neutrality to reflect national rather than
worldwide welfare maximization where ownership is elastic to taxes. Id. at 956. The
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CON when it does not affect patterns of ownership. The importance of CON
becomes apparent if one considers the fact that ownership patterns, like
investment patterns and savings decisions, though perhaps to an even greater
degree, are elastic to taxes. In any developed market, firms can buy or
dispose of business assets with relative ease, and the transaction and personal
costs of doing so are likely to be lower than those of either capital or
individual locational shifts. Indeed, Desai and Hines argue that for modern
economies, ownership considerations dominate locational decisions because
so much of international trade consists of the exploitation of different
capabilities sourced in different jurisdictions; it does not primarily involve
movements of capital.22 On this view, the typical form of cross-border
investment is not the transfer of physical capital or the movement of its
owners, but the shift in ownership of stationary capital from one country's
nationals to another's. Concomitantly, when ownership moves out of the
jurisdiction, it is more commonly replaced by an offsetting ownership shift
elsewhere in the system than by a net movement of capital. New owners step
in to fill the void created when property changes hands. In short, crossborder transactions are mostly about aligning competencies to manage fixedbase capital, not about moving capital into or out of productive
jurisdictions. 2 3
Thus, in the simplest case, suppose that the locations of all capital
and all taxpayers are fixed but that taxpayers can acquire capital at home or
abroad. In a first-best world without taxes, some optimal pattern of
ownership of the fixed supply of worldwide capital will emerge, reflecting
on one hand synergies of combined ownership of different productive
activities, the advantages of vertical over horizontal integration, and other
factors weighing in favor of combination, and on the other hand the
advantages of specialized ownership of specialized industries, the limitations
of hierarchical organizations to manage large or heterogeneous sets of assets
and business opportunities, competitive price pressures, and other factors
weighing in favor of dispersed ownership.24 If the introduction of taxes
affects the tax burden on prospective owners differently, then tax
considerations are apt to alter this optimal pre-tax pattern of ownership,
resulting in efficiency losses. Because, under a worldwide system, all
taxpayers face the same relative cost to any investment, tax-motivated
ownership shifts will not arise.2 5
discussion here is confined to the examination of worldwide welfare-maximizing
benchmarks.
22. Id. at 956.
23. Id. ("[M]ost FDI [(foreign direct investment)] represents transfers of
control and ownership, and need not involve transfers of net savings.").
24. See Hines, Reconsidering, supranote 19, at 275-77.
25. Id. at 276-77.
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2. Second Variation: TerritorialTaxation

Although an unlimited residence-based FTC system eliminates
capital location incentives, it does not preserve neutrality along a number of
other margins, including uniformity in savings versus consumption
decisions, uniformity in ownership considerations (in the case of a world of
mixed systems for tax relief), and uniformity in investor location; it also does
not preserve "competitive neutrality," which functions less as a genuine
neutrality benchmark than, arguably, as a plea for equal treatment. When
sensitivity to taxes along these margins is large, distortions may result from
pursuing CEN that are no less harmful than distortions in patterns of homeand host-country investment that worldwide taxation is designed to
eliminate.
The other major method of double-tax relief, foreign income
exemption, or so-called territorial taxation, addresses these problems. 26
Under a pure form of territorial taxation, states exempt residents' foreignsource income, loss, and expense from the tax base entirely.27 In this setting,
double taxation is eliminated because the only tax investors face on crossborder investment is foreign-source tax. Returning to the example above, the
resident of State A will face a 25 percent rate of tax if the investment is made
in State B, with State A ceding its right to tax entirely, and a 35 percent rate
if it is made at home. Analogously, a resident of State B will face the same
rates on investment in State A and State B that the State A resident faces.
A world of territorial systems has the following distinctive
properties. First, the after-tax rather than the pre-tax rate is the same
everywhere, as investment flows out of low-return jurisdictions and into
high-return ones until the worldwide rate equalizes.28 Although capital is not
optimally allocated (since its allocation is affected by tax considerations),
there is a tradeoff in that the decision about whether to save or consume,
which is based on after-tax rather than pre-tax rates of return, is no longer
affected differentially by taxes. This state of affairs is referred to as "savings

26. Most of the OECD member countries tax active foreign business
earnings on a basis closer to territoriality than to residence-based taxation. Robert
Carroll, The Importance of Tax Deferral and a Lower Corporate Tax Rate, SPECIAL
REPORT No.
174, (Tax Found., Wash. D.C.), Feb. 2010, at 5,
http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/srl74.pdf.
27. In practice, most territorial systems adopt some worldwide features (and
vice-versa) to prevent tax avoidance. Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless
Income, TAX L. REV. (2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Lessons]. As an example, the
opportunity to shift profits earned in high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions
has caused some territorial jurisdictions, such as Japan, to impose floors on the rate
applied to certain foreign-source income.
28. Knoll, Int'l Tax Neutrality, supra note 1, at 108-09.

FloridaTax Review

68

[Vol. 12:2

neutrality" 29 and, by some scholars, as "capital import neutrality" ("CIN"). 30
Second, universal territoriality preserves what is sometimes termed
competitive neutrality, or the idea that all investors face the same tax burden
on investment in a given source, regardless of their residence. Perha s
unfortunately, competitive neutrality also often goes by the name CIN.
Although, as explained below, competitive neutrality sounds more in
considerations of equality than welfare, it has been particularly influential as
a driver of international tax policy in a number of countries, including the
U.S.32 Third, universal territorial taxation, like universal worldwide taxation,
preserves CON, as the after-tax return to the owner of a fixed-base
investment is the same regardless of who owns it.
B. Neutrality Tradeoffs

The framework of international taxation and relief of double taxation
described above has set the parameters for scholarly debate on international
tax neutrality. This Subpart provides an overview of the tradeoffs that the
various neutrality benchmarks present and canvasses some of the recent
literature on international tax neutrality.
1. Homogeneous Systems

The efficiency question in evaluating any proposed tax system is
which of the available arrangements minimizes total deadweight loss for the
relevant population. 33 Here, the relevant population is assumed to be
34
countries worldwide, though in some analyses it is the individual country.
Most scholars have agreed that in the comparison of worlds consisting solely
of pure versions of either territorial or worldwide systems, the latter is

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. PEGGY B. RICHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 8 (1963) [hereinafter RICiMAN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT];
Knoll, Int'l Tax Neutrality, supra note 1, at 110-11. Knoll notes that lawyers have
tended to interpret CIN as a competitiveness benchmark (explained in the text
below), while economists have interpreted it as a savings benchmark, and that the
two groups have not always recognized they are talking about different benchmarks
in using the term "CIN."
32. Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, II FLA. TAX REV. 699, 730
(2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Stateless Income].
33. Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in
U.S. Tax Policy?, 60 TAX L. REV. 155, 155-57 (2007) [hereinafter Shaviro,
Worldwide Welfare].
34. See id. at 157.
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superior in promoting worldwide welfare. 35 Another way of stating the point
is that it is believed that promoting production neutrality - again, in the
context of the comparison of pure systems - and accepting the associated
savings, competitive and investor location distortions produces less
deadweight loss than the converse.
Within the parameters of the standard analysis, this conclusion
appears to be well founded. First, consider tax-induced locational shifts.
Under the stylized assumptions here, the failure to preserve locational
neutrality of capital owners under worldwide systems would not seem to
merit concern, since the location of the owner ought to have little impact on
worldwide productivity. Thus, suppose that the quantity of investment capital
and the identity of its owners are fixed, so that the sole tax-based incentive
that arises under a pure worldwide system is for an owner in a high-tax
jurisdiction to move to a low-tax jurisdiction, leaving capital where it is. The
owner then would enjoy the low-tax jurisdiction's crediting of foreign tax
paid in excess of source tax due when it makes economic sense to locdte the
investment in the higher-tax jurisdiction. As a result, total worldwide output
would continue to be maximized despite the tax-induced decision to change
the residence of the owner. Under these circumstances, it is unclear what
inefficiency arises. Rather, the effects, if any, will be distributive and on
administrative costs, as tax revenues will be eroded in low-tax source
jurisdictions while administrative costs will be shifted to them.
These considerations become somewhat less decisive if one relaxes
the unrealistic assumption that the quantity of capital available for
investment is fixed. Treating this margin as somewhat tax-elastic, the fact
that worldwide systems preserve production neutrality must be weighed
against the fact that they do not preserve savings neutrality.36 If one assumes
there is a single, optimal worldwide rate of return to savings that is
approximated by the weighted after-tax return across all jurisdictions, then
worldwide taxation introduces distortions in the decision to save or invest.
Investors located in high-tax jurisdictions will save too much, while those in
low-tax jurisdictions will save too little. One may conclude that this situation
is non-optimal because worldwide welfare theoretically could be increased if
some of the return to savings earned in the low-tax jurisdiction were
reallocated to the high-tax jurisdiction.37 A territorial system avoids this
distortion because the after-tax return to all investments worldwide will
converge into a single worldwide rate, for, if there were differences in the
35. Hines, Reconsidering, supra note 19, at 274.
36. Rosanne Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on Deferral, 87
TAx NOTES 255, 257 (Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Altshuler, Recent Developments];
Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of InternationalInvestment Income,

94 Q. J. EcoN. 793, 793 (1980) [hereinafter Horst, Optimal Taxation].
37. Altshuler, Recent Developments, supra note 36, at 257.
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after-tax rate of return in two jurisdictions, capital would flow to the one
providing the higher rate (even though the allocation would not be desirable
in terms of production efficiency) until the rates were equalized.3 8
Although territorial systems preserve savings neutrality, the
proposition that savings neutrality is a proper subject of efficiency analysis
when the focus is on worldwide welfare is debatable. 39 Differing incentives
to save or consume across jurisdictions would appear to be more a reflection
of differing policy choices about the optimal mix of private and public
returns to savings than to be an inefficiency traceable to tax-motivated
incentives for cross-border investment. 40 Further, it is not clear that savings
decisions are as responsive as capital location decisions to taxes;41 higher
taxes may induce both income and substitution effects among savers,
meaning that some taxpayers may save more (on a pre-tax basis) in the
presence of the tax than in its absence in order to ensure they have adequate
savings in light of a greater tax burden.42 Nevertheless, the view that the
inefficiency resulting from non-uniformity in returns to savers has equal
status with production inefficiency has had a significant influence in the
literature, 4 3 and a number of scholars have framed the question of optimal
tax design in terms of the relative efficiency losses arising from pursuing
either efficiency benchmark - production versus savings.44
Finally, consider competitive neutrality, or the idea that some form
of neutrality exists when investors meet on an equal tax footing in a given
3 8. Id.

39. Hines, Reconsidering,supra note 19, at 274.
40. See id. ("As a practical matter, since many national policies influence
the return to savers, CIN is often dismissed as a policy objective .... ).
41. See DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE EcoNOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING
THE RICH (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000) (presenting research on the sensitivity of
savings decisions to tax rates).
42. For an explanation of income effects, see HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED
GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 19 (9th ed. 2010) [hereinafter ROSEN & GAYER, PUBLIC
FINANCE].

43. E.g., Altshuler, Recent Developments, supra note 36, at 256 ("The

standard result [in the analysis of the efficiency properties of residence- and sourcebased taxation] is that a pure residence system ensures efficiency in investment
location decisions whereas a pure source system preserves efficiency in savings
decisions.").
44. See, e.g., Altshuler, Recent Developments, supra note 36, at 258. See
generally Knoll, Int'l Tax Neutrality, supra note 1, at 100-01; Horst, Optimal

Taxation, supra note 36. It also has been observed that the availability of deferral in
worldwide systems such as the United States', coupled with the formality of
corporate residence for U.S. tax purposes, makes it easier for taxpayers to shift the
location of capital owners to lower-tax jurisdictions, thereby moving toward savings
neutrality. Altshuler, Recent Developments, supra note 36, at 257.
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jurisdiction. 45 Returning again to the discussion example, if States A and B
each tax on a territorial basis, then investors from either jurisdiction face the
same rate on income from the source that investors located in the source face
on their source-based investments, regardless of the rates that States A and B
impose on domestic income. This arrangement is competitively "neutral" in
the sense that home-country rules do not disadvantage home residents in
their competition with other taxpayers for investment in the host. However,
as contrasted with CEN and, at least arguably, with savings neutrality, the
pursuit of CIN as competitive neutrality does not promote worldwide
welfare; indeed, it does not appear directly to promote the welfare of any
constituency other than home-country multinational residents in high-tax
jurisdictions, for the benefits to them are offset by detriments to those against
whom they compete for investment; this group includes home-country
investors that lack access to foreign markets. (And maintaining even this
benchmark assumes that other jurisdictions do not retaliate against the
residence jurisdiction's decision to pursue competitive neutrality).46
Consequently, cometitive neutrality has been characterized as cheerleading
for the home team rather than a genuine neutrality benchmark, though it
might more aptly be characterized as trickle-down neutrality for homecountry residents who, in theory, could benefit from home-country
multinationals' prosperity. 4 8 Perhaps the best one can say about competitive
neutrality is that it sounds in some theory of investor equality. 4 9
As discussed above, the final neutrality benchmark, CON, does not
come into play in the comparison of pure homogeneous systems. Both the
universal adoption of pure worldwide tax systems and the universal adoption
of pure territorial systems preserve CON.5 0

45. RICHMAN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 31, at 8.
46. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, The Role of U.S. Tax Policy in
Offshoring, in BROOKINGS TRADE FORuM 2005: OFFSHORING WHITE-COLLAR

WORK 457, 473 (2006). ("Thus, capital import neutrality [in the competitiveness
sense] generally puts the international competitiveness of a country's multinational
firms ahead of considerations regarding optimal investment location or government
revenue. For example, capital may be allocated inefficiently toward low-tax
locations because after-tax rates of return in such locations are higher.")
47. Shaviro, Worldwide Welfare, supra note 33, at 155-56.

48. Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 27.
49. Shaheen, Reconsiderationssupra note 14, at 210.
50. Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax
Reform, 51 NAT'L TAX J. 487, 495 (2003). [hereinafter Desai & Hines, Evaluating
Int'l Tax Reform].
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Mixed and Limited Systems

Under standard neutrality models, the case for universal adoption of
worldwide systems becomes less decisive once the idealized assumptions of
the preceding section are relaxed. In the actual world, no residence-based
system provides an unlimited FTC, heterogeneity of methods of double-tax
relief obtains, and some amount of deferral of foreign-source income is
available even under worldwide systems. Each of these real-world features
introduces tax distortions for states seeking to promote CEN.
First, consider the case of the limitation on FTCs. As a practical
matter, a country that provides an unlimited FTC would suffer dramatic
erosion of its tax base, as net capital importing countries could raise taxes
arbitrarily high with no adverse effect on levels of inbound investment from
countries using the FTC regime. Consequently, no country has permitted
FTCs in excess of the taxpayer's erstwhile domestic tax liability.51 The
limitation means that residents of FTC jurisdictions with lower rates face
higher taxes on investments in high-tax jurisdictions than on investments at
home or in other jurisdictions having rates not in excess of the home rate.
Residents of high-tax FTC jurisdictions, however, face the same rate on
investments wherever located. In addition, residents of high-tax FTC
jurisdictions have an incentive to locate both themselves and capital in lowtax jurisdictions, since then, but only then, can they secure the lower tax rate
they would otherwise obtain just by relocating themselves and leaving
capital where it was in a system of unlimited FTCs. The net effect of both
phenomena is to create a worldwide bias towards investment in lower-taxed
jurisdictions, which effectively moves the world in the direction of territorial
taxation.52 Depending on the magnitude of the effects, a formal switch to
territoriality could actually be welfare enhancing, since it eliminates taxinduced shifts of ownership that arise under an incomplete implementation of
worldwide taxation while preserving savings neutrality and, more
importantly, ownership neutrality.
Heterogeneity of tax systems has a similar effect. In a multi-state
world in which one or more jurisdictions adopt territorial taxation, residents
of countries employing a residence-based FTC system are at a tax
disadvantage when compared with residents in territorial jurisdictions with
respect to investment opportunities in low-tax jurisdictions. To illustrate,
consider a world composed of States X, Y, and Z. X and Y each impose tax
at a flat 35 percent rate on domestic-source income, but whereas X adopts
worldwide taxation with an FTC for its residents and nationals, Y adopts a
51. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 904(a).
52. Hines, Reconsidering, supra note 19, at 273; Peggy B. Musgrave,
Capital Import Neutrality, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 50, 50
(Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
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territorial system under which neither foreign-source income nor foreignsource expense is accounted for. Z is a net capital importing country that has
adopted a flat 10 percent rate on Z-sourced income. (Z's method of taxing
non-Z-sourced income is immaterial for the example.) When compared to Y
residents, X residents face a tax disadvantage with respect to the Z-sourced
investment because X residents cannot respond to the tax advantage of the Zsourced investment, while Y residents can. The difficulty that this type of
situation creates forms the basis for regular pleas from U.S. industry for the
U.S. to move to a territorial system, as most industrialized nations have
done. 54
ownership
to
importantly, the tax-insensitivity
Equally
considerations that arises in a world of residence-based systems disappears in
a world of mixed systems." In the mixed setting, the incentives that
residents of worldwide tax jurisdictions face differ from the incentives that
residents of territorial jurisdictions face, as illustrated in the example in the
preceding paragraph. In particular, residents of high-tax residence-based
jurisdictions will be at a disadvantage compared to residents of high-tax
territorial jurisdictions when it comes to investment opportunities in low-tax
jurisdictions because they lack the incentive that residents of territorial
jurisdictions have to invest in the low-tax jurisdiction. If the contention is
true that most cross-border transactions involve shifting ownership of fixedbase capital, the tax disadvantage to a -country employing a high-tax
worldwide system becomes very lar e, while the tax loss of shifting to a
territorial system becomes very small.
Finally, consider the problem of deferral, as exemplified by the U.S.
case. Formally, the U.S. pursues CEN through worldwide taxation of its
citizens and residents together with the provision of a limited FTC.57
Consistent with the standard assumptions discussed in Section 1, the costs to
U.S. individuals of escaping U.S. tax on income they directly own are
relatively high, because doing so generally requires the individual to leave
the U.S., something most residents are reluctant to do. Consequently, it
would appear that the U.S.'s promotion of CEN increases worldwide welfare
more than would its promotion of either version of CIN. The difficulty with
53. See Kleinbard,Lessons, supra note 27, for a discussion of this problem.
54. Id. Kleinbard describes these pleas as demands that the U.S. move to
"cartoon territoriality."
55. Hines, Reconsidering,supra note 19, at 276.

56. Desai and Hines derive $50 billion (in 2004) as a rough estimate of the
dollar value of the annual efficiency losses to U.S. multinationals from the U.S.
system of quasi-worldwide taxation (i.e., worldwide taxation with significant
deferral opportunities). Desai & Hines, Old Rules, supra note 4, at 955.
57. See Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (U.S. citizens and residents are subject to tax on
their worldwide income.); I.R.C. § 901 (foreign tax credit).
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this analysis is that under U.S. law, the cost of shifting the identity of the
immediate owner of capital to a non-U.S. person is quite low because
corporate residency for U.S tax purposes is almost entirely a formal matter. It
depends upon the place of incorporation, not the location of significant
managerial, production, or other operations, or on ultimate beneficial
ownership of corporate capital. 58 When coupled with the fact that most
active business income of foreign corporations that are owned by U.S.
persons is not taxed until it is repatriated, 59 the result is a tax system that
approaches territoriality because of deferral and the ability of taxpayers to
time inclusions with offsetting losses.60 As a consequence, the neutrality
question in the U.S. setting has to some extent devolved into a question of
determining the appropriate limits on deferral.61 If the ultimate U.S. owners
of non-U.S.-source income can defer inclusion for U.S. tax purposes for long
enough, the fact that the income ultimately is subject to tax at U.S. rates will
not deter taxpayers from shifting formal ownership together with actual
capital from domestic to foreign entities. This shifting is completely at odds
with CEN because the incentive arises to move capital to the low-tax
jurisdiction based on the after-tax, not pre-tax, rate of return there. In effect,
deferral pushes the system closer to territoriality.62 However, it comes with
the further disadvantage that an efficiency loss arises from the tax cost on
repatriation of foreign profits under the U.S. system that would be absent
under territoriality. Because the U.S. continues to tax foreign-source income
when it is repatriated, the large incentive to earn income offshore is coupled
with a large disincentive to bring it into the U.S.63 This disincentive has

58. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4).
59. The U.S. system requires immediate inclusion by certain U.S. persons
of corporate profits earned through certain controlled foreign corporations and
passive foreign investment companies. See I.R.C. §§ 951-65 CFCs, 1291 (PFICs).
Neither of these regimes, however, currently taxes most earnings of actively
conducted foreign businesses.
60. See Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 32, at 718-19, for a
comprehensive analysis of the problem.
61. See, e.g., Altshuler, Recent Developments, supra note 36, at 255. If, for
example, the discount rate is 5 percent, then a ten-year deferral of tax reduces the
effective rate by approximately 39 percent; a twenty-year deferral reduces it by 62
percent.
62. E.g., id. at 257; Shaviro, Worldwide Welfare, supra note 33, at 160.
63. It is probably more accurate to say that the disincentive is to bring the
cash back efficiently rather to bring it back at all. For example, a U.S. multinational
can obtain the economic benefit onshore of earnings held offshore through
borrowing secured by the offshore earnings or through other similar mechanisms.
The effect of such arrangements is to overcome the gross inefficiency of keeping
earnings offshore solely for tax reasons, but it comes at the price of establishing and
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regularly given rise to demands from U.S. multinationals, occasionally
successful,64 for both short-run relief in the form of tax holidays and the
transition to a full-blown territorial system.6 5
3.

Conclusion on Tradeoffs

Against the backdrop of the considerations outlined above, a lively
debate in the U.S. context has emerged on the relative merits of worldwide
and territorial taxation, principally on the question of whether the U.S.
should move to shore up its worldwide system or instead move to more fullblown territoriality.66 Those taking the latter position have argued that
substantial deadweight loss arises when the residence or owner of capital
changes in response to taxes, as it must when the system is heterogeneous or
the FTC is limited.67 That is, they have argued that there is no reason to. bear
the efficiency losses associated with tax-induced changes in ownership and
savings non-neutrality, or (taking a national welfare perspective) the losses
from competition with investors located in territorial jurisdictions, when the
benefits from doing so - limited neutrality with respect to the location of
capital, or CEN - have been lost anyway. On top of these losses are losses
resulting from the incentive to keep offshore earnings offshore unless and
until they can be repatriated on a tax-favored basis.68 A territorial system
would remove this incentive (as would a purer worldwide one). Others have
argued that territorial taxation is not inferior to residence-based taxation even
maintaining the relevant tax-avoidance strategy. I thank Ed Kleinbard for identifying
this point.
64. See, e.g., American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357,
§ 422, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) (enacting I.R.C. § 965, which provided for a temporary
reduction in rate, to 5.25 percent, on certain foreign income repatriated to the United
States).
65. See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 27. Kleinbard notes that most of
these pleas are for systems that he terms "cartoon territoriality" - that is, systems so

generous as to effectively permit full tax exemption for U.S. multinationals. Id.
66. See, e.g., Robert C. Pozen, A Two-Pronged Approach to Reforming
International Corporate Taxes in the US., 63 TAx NOTES INT'L 951 (Sept. 26,
2011).

67. A prominent example is the proposal that former President George W.
Bush's tax reform panel made to move to an exemption system. President's
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair,and Pro-Growth:Proposalsto
Fix America's Tax System 103-07 (2005). For a critique of the Panel's proposal, see
J. Clifton Fleming Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Exploring the Contours of a ProposedUS.
Exemption (Territorial) Tax System, 109 TAx NOTES 1557 (Dec. 19, 2005)
[hereinafter Fleming & Peroni, Exploring].
68. See Desai & Hines, Old Rules, supra note 4, at 938, and Kleinbard,

Lessons, supra note 27 for (quite different) discussions of this problem.
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on first-best grounds and that it is much preferable given the much wider use
of territorial systems today.69 For example, from the perspective of CON, the
adoption of territoriality would be superior to remaining with a residencebased system in light of the wide use of territoriality by other countries and
the contention that most of the efficiency losses associated with taxing crossborder transactions arise from ownership rather than capital-location or
savings distortions.70
On the other side, a number of commentators have argued that the
solution to the problem of corporate residence-shifting is to tighten the rules
on deferral, thereby movin Icloser to a true worldwide system, and not to
abandon the ideal of CEN. In response to the Desai and Hines argument
that the dominant margin of tax-induced behavior is ownership, some have
argued that ownership is, at best, one of a number of relevant margins of
response to tax rules and that no evidence has yet been offered to show that
tax-induced ownership effects swamp capital-location effects.72 Against the
view that worldwide taxation is inadvisable on competitive grounds when
most jurisdictions pursue territorial taxation, it has been noted that even
territorial jurisdictions tend to adopt worldwide tax features for foreignsource income that is subject to exceptionally low rates, that most
industrialized countries tend to have rates roughly comparable to each other
(so that tax considerations may be minimized as long as it is not possible to
exploit tax havens), and that if the U.S. moved closer to true worldwide
taxation, other countries might follow suit. 73
Which of these positions is correct depends in some measure on who
is right about the economic facts - where the margins are more elastic and
what efficiency costs result as taxpayers respond to tax incentives along one
or another of them. But the assumption that there are answers to these
questions depends on the more basic premise that neutrality is a wellformulated concept, for if it is not, then it is not clear what it means to say
that one set of tax rules is more distorting than another and, consequently, is
associated with greater efficiency losses. The next part makes the case that
neutrality has not been well-defined in the international tax literature; the
parts following offer an alternative way to consider the relationship between
tax rules and productivity and an argument for applying different policy
criteria in evaluating international tax rules.

69. E.g., Shaheen, Reconsiderations,supranote 14, at 205-06.
70. Hines, Reconsidering,supra note 19, at 282.
71. See, e.g., Fleming & Peroni, Exploring,supra note 67, at 1577.
72. E.g., Mitchell A. Kane, Commentary, Considering "Reconsideringthe
Taxation of Foreign Income, " 62 TAx L. REv. 299 (2009) [hereinafter Kane,
Considering"Reconsidering"].
73. Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 27.
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III. NEUTRALITY GENERALLY

The discussion in Part II was designed to explicate the problem that
double taxation of cross-border income poses for efficiency analysis and to
give a flavor for the debates surrounding the relative merits of various
methods of double-tax relief. In what follows, I offer a criticism of the
supposition that the relevant baselines for the evaluation of tax distortions are
well specified under standard approaches. As contrasted with narrower
inquiries into whether one or another local legal change is likely to increase
or reduce efficiency system-wide, the global question of which international
tax regime is closest to an ideal of neutrality has not been well-formulated in
the neutrality literature. In the case of local changes, one can make a
meaningful evaluation of the effects of a new rule in light of reasonably fixed
background conditions; in the case of global changes, current approaches fail
to specify an ideal against which the actual world is to be measured because
the ideal turns out to be affected by the world for which it is supposed to
operate as an ideal.
This feedback effect materializes because any system for taxing
cross-border arrangements causes economic actors to make decisions that
affect not only the amount of tax paid, but which jurisdiction receives it;
correlatively, the tax system will cause actors to make decisions that affect
the burden in every jurisdiction on tax-financed goods because capital (and
perhaps labor), like tax revenues, flows across borders, and because, even
when it does not, trade-induced adjustments in productivity will have
comparable effects. When economic decisions cause tax revenue streams or
capital assets to be redirected from one jurisdiction to another, or affect the
local productivity of capital (as under the CON analysis), they affect the
absolute productivity of the factors of production in all jurisdictions because
of the relationship between tax revenues and tax amenities: tax revenues
finance productivity-enhancing tax amenities. As productivity rates diverge
from prior levels, the rate of return that was supposed to remain uniform
across jurisdictions under the relevant benchmark (e.g., pre-tax for
production neutrality, after-tax for savings neutrality) diverges as well,
meaning that the benchmark is not maintained.
One can frame the point as follows. There are not two but at least
three moving parts to the analysis of the effects on rates of return of any
regime for taxing cross-border income: (1) the flow of capital (and possibly
labor or investors) and adjustments to productivity in response to taxes, (2)
the adjustments in both net importing and net exporting countries to the
relative prices of factors of production that result from these flows, and (3)
the effects of (1) and (2) on both tax revenues and the burdens that tax
revenues pay for in every affected jurisdiction. Analysis of the first two items
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is part of the standard fare of neutrality analysis, 74 but the third, which
generally has been overlooked, is also important to a comprehensive analysis
of a tax system's neutrality properties. Because levels of funding for tax
amenities affect the absolute rate of return to factors of production in each
jurisdiction, tax-induced adjustments to tax revenues or to burdens that tax
revenues pay for, no less than changes in the relative supply of and demand
for factors of production, will affect the productivity of those factors, and
indeed in ways that diverge between the affected jurisdictions.
This Part illustrates the problem by examining the development of
the neutrality model in the domestic setting and the difficulties that arise
when the model is appropriated for use in the international setting. Subpart A
explicates the concept of tax neutrality in general terms. Subpart B examines
the question of how to articulate the problem of non-neutrality in the
international setting, concluding that the most cogent statement of the
problem is one that analyzes the effects of moving from a system of closed
economies to one of open economies. Because this statement also subverts
the idea of the single-tax-affected baseline that underwrites the analysis of
tax distortions, it turns out that the concept of neutrality in the international
setting is not well-formulated under standard approaches.
A.

Tax Neutrality Generally

Under the standard public finance model, a tax is optimally efficient
when it does not change relative prices.7 5 A tax that has this property is said
to be neutral. Correlatively, if taxes do change relative prices, then prices are
said to be "distorted" and, when the change alters the decisions of economic
actors, the decisions are said to be distorted as well.76 Such tax-affected
decisions are characterized as distortions because they produce less total
social wealth than would result in their absence. This conclusion follows if
one accepts the assumptions commonly applied to describe the behavior of
rational actors in free markets - namely, that they have ordered preferences,
74. See, e.g., Desai & Hines, Old Rules, supra note 4; Hines,
Reconsidering, supra note 19; Knoll Int'l Tax Neutrality, supra note 1; Shaheen,
Reconsiderations,supra note 14.
75. See, e.g., ROSEN & GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 42, at 19. Taxinduced changes in relative prices are to be distinguished from tax-induced changes
in absolute prices, which also may cause taxpayers to alter the composition of goods
and services they consume or the labor they supply. Id. To the extent a tax-induced
price change is absolute, the alteration in behavior is said to result from so-called
income effects, or the fact that the taxpayer is poorer in absolute terms by reason of
paying the tax and, consequently, has a lower budget line. Id. Income effects are not
inefficient, though they may be problematic for other reasons, for example, that they
reduce the wealth of the wrong person.
76. Id. at 329.
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that they are free to deploy their resources to satisfy those preferences, and
that there are no externalities.7 7 In this setting, total social wealth is
maximized. Consequently, when decisions are affected by tax-induced
changes to relative prices, the resulting arrangements do not maximize total
social wealth because individuals have substituted less-efficient outcomes for
more-efficient ones as a means to maximize their after-tax welfare. The
reduction in total social wealth that arises through these substitution effects is
referred to as the deadweight loss, or excess burden, of taxes. 79
The following simple example illustrates these ideas. Suppose that a
taxpayer faces two investment opportunities, one of which, Opportunity A,
has an expected value of $X and the other of which, Opportunity B, has an
expected value of $.9X, in both cases on a pre-tax basis. In the absence of tax
considerations, and disregarding the possibility that risk preferences might
affect the investment decision, the taxpayer would choose Opportunity A. If,
however, Opportunity A is sufficiently less favorably taxed than Opportunity
B, the taxpayer will choose Opportunity B, other things equal. In such a case,
the decision is distorted by taxes as compared to a baseline of the efficiencymaximizing non-tax world. In the example, $0.9X rather than $X of total
social wealth is created, simply because the ultimate value to the taxpayer is
greater if the non-wealth-maximizing choice is made.
The "non-tax" world is a standard heuristic employed to get at the
idea that taxes create these sorts of inefficiencies. However, the non-tax
world cannot function as a true baseline for the simple reason that taxes are
necessary to fund infrastructure and other goods that make possible a system
of competitive markets in which rational actors satisfy their ordered
preferences. In other words, the non-tax world would seem to require taxes
in order to function as the baseline against which to measure the effect of
taxes. This difficulty, however, can be functionally circumvented if one bears
in mind that the problem is not, strictly speaking, the existence of taxes but
the fact that most real-world taxes create substitution effects because tax
liability is determined, in part, by economic decisions. Stated otherwise, realworld taxes alter the relative prices of goods. For example, even a broadbased income tax creates an incentive to work less if leisure goes untaxed
because the tax alters the relative prices of work and leisure. Consequently,
we can expect leisure to be over-supplied and labor to be under-supplied
77. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM

D. NORDHAUS,

ECONOMICS 84-106 (19th ed. 2010).
78. This is simply a statement of the first fundamental theorem of welfare
economics, which itself can be considered a formal version of Adam Smith's theory

of the invisible hand. See Allan M. Feldman, Welfare Economics, in 4 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 889 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).

79. ROSEN & GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE, supranote 42, at 329-36.
80. See id at 330.
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even under a broad-based low-rate income tax system, when compared to a
system in which tax revenue is raised in some way that does not affect the
decision about how much labor to supply.
The question, then, is whether it is possible for tax revenue in fact to
be supplied in a way that does not affect behavior. In general, a tax imposed
without regard to what the taxpayer does - generally referred to as a lumpsum tax - is thought to have this property. A head tax is the simplest
example of such a tax. Although a head tax may affect taxpayer behavior
simply because taxpayers have fewer resources, and may be objectionable on
distributive or other grounds, the absolute reduction in wealth it effects does
not lead to inefficient substitutions, but only to less consumption (or more
production) as a way to compensate for the reduced wealth. Relative prices
remain unaffected and, as a result, resources continue to be allocated
optimally.8 ' Distributive concerns can, theoretically, be addressed either
through government redistribution or by tailoring the lump-sum tax liability
to whatever non-behavior-affected metric is deemed appropriate. 82
If one begins with the idea of a lump-sum-tax-financed world as the
baseline, it becomes possible to sketch a model of tax neutrality in the
closed-economy setting. A revenue target is exogenously set based upon
some procedure by which relevant preferences are aggregated and sorted.
This exercise is part of the larger procedure for identifying and implementing
what is commonly termed the "social welfare function,",83 or the societal
determination about how to weigh individual utilities and other tradeoffs
among conflicting values. For example, in a democratic polity, voters might
express their preferences about levels of tax-financed amenities through a
referendum in which the majority prevails, or the choice might be mediated
through the election of representatives empowered to make decisions about
such matters.84 The level having been set, a base and rate schedule are then
adopted. The latter decisions would, it is hoped, be based on efficiency
considerations and take into account as well the various additional costs of
administering the tax system. Although the base is unlikely to include, much
81. Id. at 332.
82. Thus, the standard assumption in the public finance literature is that the
optimal theoretical tax would be a lump-sum tax assessed on the basis of wage rate
or ability (not actual wages). An ability base would seem to combine the tax
neutrality properties sought from an efficiency perspective with the desired utilitymaximizing distributive properties, assuming the declining marginal utility of
ability. See id. at 333. A large literature addresses the philosophical cogency of this
view. See Linda Sugin, A PhilosophicalObjection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 Tax

L. Rev. 229 (2011) (reviewing the literature).
83. See, e.g., ROSEN & GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 42, at 44.
84. See Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining MarginalUtility and Tax

Policy, 95 MINN. L. REv. 904, 913-14 (2011), for a discussion of social welfare
functions.
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less to consist solely of, lump-sum taxes, it is at least possible to have in
view the economy that would result if the desired levels of tax-financed
amenities were funded with lump-sum taxes.8 5 That economy represents the
"non-tax world," or more accurately, the non-tax-affected world, and
deviations from that world that result from tax-induced substitution effects
represent tax distortions. The world has its own distributive and productive
properties, including a pre-tax rate of return.
It is important to be clear about the conceptual price that
employment of the idea of the non-tax-affected world exacts on the theory of
tax distortions. Initially, the observation that the existence of a rate of return
requires tax-financed amenities vitiated the notion of a non-tax-world that
would operate as a baseline to measure tax distortions. The motivating idea
of that model, however, is not that there are no taxes, but that taxes do not
affect decision making by causing taxpayers to substitute more favorablytaxed goods or services for those less favorably taxed. It was then recognized
that if taxes were conceptualized as imposed on a lump-sum basis, the link
would be severed between the funding of goods paid for with tax revenues
and the avoidance behavior of the individuals that pay for them. The
resulting model purports to solve the problem of establishing the conditions
under which a non-tax-distorted rate of return is possible even though taxes
must somehow be collected, but the model is not complete. Since different
quantities of tax-financed goods supplied correspond to different quantities
of tax-financed amenities and, in consequence, different private-sector rates
of return, one cannot establish the rate of return in the non-tax-affected
world without a specification of the revenue target. The target itself,
however, cannot be derived from the conditions imposed by the model but,
rather, must be taken as an exogenously given amount based on a normative
judgment - for instance, by ascertaining and applying the operative social
welfare function. The pre-tax rate of return, in other words, does not exist as
a purely factual datum..
B. Adapting Neutrality to the InternationalSetting

The question on the table is whether the closed-economy model can
be adapted to the international setting without loss of normative or analytic
85. See Roin, Competition, supra note 7, at 552 (noting the usefulness of

the lump-sum ideal as a baseline against which to measure the distortions of actual
taxes in a single jurisdiction).
86. See Part III.C. for a criticism of the view of taxes according to which
lump-sum taxation provides a non-tax distorted baseline.
87. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Lau et al., Efficiency in the Optimum Supply of
Public Goods, 46 ECONOMETRICA 269, 269 (1978) (noting the "dependence of

private consumption, and hence of tax revenue, on the supply of public goods ...).
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power. In the international setting, the analog of the non-tax-affected world
is the non-double-tax-affected world. That is, one level of real, non-lumpsum tax, together with its distortions, is taken as given, and the question is
how that level will be maintained with minimal additional distortions in light
of the rights of both home and host countries to tax cross-border
89
transactions.
The trouble is that, as will be developed below, no matter the starting
point, tax-motivated behavior that results from the chosen neutrality regime
fails to preserve the relevant rate of non-tax-affected return (pre-tax or aftertax) over all affected jurisdictions. As capital flows respond to the tax
incentives created under the rules for cross-border transactions, both tax
revenues and the burdens that tax revenues pay for are reallocated between
home and host jurisdictions. Over the long term, the correspondence in each
jurisdiction between levels of tax-financed amenities and the burdens on
resources and infrastructure that the amenities pay for diverges as well,
causing real rates of return to move, often in opposite directions, in home and
host jurisdictions. Any benchmark defined with reference to the preservation
of a rate of return therefore is not met and neutrality is not preserved. This
result implies that under standard approaches, the non-double-tax-affected
world cannot be specified for any system of independent jurisdictions in
which tax rules create incentives that cause tax revenues or the burdens they
pay for to be redirected from one jurisdiction to another.
The following discussion develops these ideas by examining three
possible non-double-tax-affected starting points and evolutions to the realworld case: a tax-free world to which taxes are added on; a world of open
economies, each of which initially has the same tax rate and in which rates
are then made to differ across jurisdictions; and a world of single-taxed,
closed economies that become open economies. It will be seen that only the
last of the starting points actually states the problem in a coherent way. But
that way of formulating the problem demonstrates both that "neutrality" is
88. Technically, it would be more accurate to refer to the analog of the nontax-affected world as the "single-tax-affected world," since double non-taxation
creates problems analogous to those of double taxation. As it is commonly framed,
however, the problem is one of double taxation arising from the joint rights of source
and residence to tax; double non-taxation generally arises because of tax base
inconsistencies or strategic efforts to avoid tax, both topics that fall outside the scope
of the present discussion.
89. Thus, tax treaties typically describe the elimination of double taxation
as the central objective of the treaty. See, e.g., United Nations Model Double
Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, Introduction,
A.2, http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpanOO2084.pdf
("Broadly, the general objectives of bilateral tax conventions may today be seen to
include the full protection of taxpayers against double taxation (whether direct or
indirect) . . . .").
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violated as soon as cross-border trade is introduced, and that over the long
term the resulting tax-motivated decisions are as likely to improve overall
productivity as to harm it.
1. FirstPossibleApproach: From Non-Tax to Single-Tax World

The first approach posits as a baseline a tax-free world and an
associated tax-free rate of return to capital. 90 In this setting, the question
becomes what happens to rates of return and capital allocations when
different jurisdictions impose different rates of tax and adopt different
methods of double-tax relief.
For the reasons stated above, it is difficult to motivate this approach.
Because taxes are necessary to finance various goods needed for wellfunctioning markets to exist, a genuinely tax-free world would be one that
lacked the features of a market economy; it would be one of rudimentary
trade. As the preceding subpart explained, this problem arises in the closedeconomy setting as well, but it can be addressed by substituting the concept
of the non-tax-affected world for the tax-free world. The non-tax-affected
world is operationalized (ideally) through lump-sum taxation. However, the
concept of the non-tax-affected world requires an exogenously specified
decision about the amount of tax revenue to be raised, since this target,
together with other factors, determines the "pre-tax" rate of return. Without
such a specification, the non-tax-affected world is indeterminate because
different levels of exogenously given funding (via lump-sum taxation) result
in different rates of private-sector return in the non-tax-affected world.
Consider, for example, the absolute productivity differences of capital
(human and physical) in Algeria and Canada, two countries of roughly equal
population but dramatically different levels of development and histories of
taxation. Taking GDP per capita as a proxy for capital productivity, capital in
Canada is approximately 550 percent more productive than in Algeria.91
Undoubtedly many factors contribute to this difference, but among them are
the relative differences in transportation infrastructure, educational
opportunities, a well-functioning and reliable administrative state, and other
features of industrialization that are paid for over a considerable period with
taxes and that contribute to the capacity of private parties to develop and
diversify human capital and native resources. Not surprisingly, the
percentage of GDP that historically has gone to taxes in Canada is about four

90. See, e.g., Shaheen, Reconsiderations,supranote 14, at 214-15.
91. Canada's GDP per capita in 2010 was $39,057, and Algeria's was

$6,950, in each case based on purchasing-power-parity dollars. Figures are IMF
estimates. http://tinyurl.com/6e6acpx.
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times greater than the percentage in Algeria: approximately 32.2 percent as
compared to approximately 8 percent. 92
2. Second PossibleApproach: From Single Rate to Divergent Rates

A second approach would begin with a world in which all states
imposed the same level of tax and adopted some form of double-tax relief,
and then examine the efficiency consequences under alternative methods of
double-tax relief, if tax rates are subsequently made to diverge. Since in the
initial state all jurisdictions impose tax at the same rate, it would appear that
under any method or methods of double-tax relief, the initial state of the
world would be non-double-tax-distorted. Thus, the results under worldwide
taxation with an unlimited FTC would be the same as under pure territorial
taxation. Each taxpayer would face one rate of tax that is the same across
jurisdictions, paid in every case to the source. The single rate also would
apply in a world of mixed jurisdictions, in which some states adopted
territorial taxation and the others worldwide taxation with an FTC. Again,
each taxpayer would face a single rate of tax paid exclusively to the source.
However counterfactual as a practical matter, this world at least would
provide a theoretical articulation of the standard against which to measure
tax distortions: a single-tax-affected world in which all individuals face the
same rate of tax regardless of location of individual or capital and regardless
of ownership. The system of double-tax relief under varying tax rates that
created the least distortion from the baseline of the system under identical tax
rates then would be the most efficient.
This method of conceptualizing the non-tax-distorted world is
somewhat better than the first, but fundamentally it does not address the
problem of dealing with tax non-neutrality. It requires the same decision on
initial tax rates that individual states operating as closed economies face in
setting a revenue target. Since heterogeneity on this decision is what
characterizes the essential nature of the problem - as well as the actual
world - it is not possible to pick a fixed rate that represents a non-distorted
baseline without making a normative decision about appropriate levels of
tax-financed amenities. Therefore, even though it is possible to model the
actual world as a set of variations from any particular arbitrarily chosen
baseline, one would not be entitled to conclude that the efficiency costs
associated with the variations represented distortions.
One might counter that, at least within a plausible range, all states
would choose to impose taxes at a rate that approximately maximizes the
return to privately-held capital. On this view, heterogeneity outside of the
range would not be the product of divergent national tastes on levels of tax92. 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view-by-variables (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
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financed amenities; rather it would result from technical or other constraints,
such as cognitive bias, on the capacities of different jurisdictions to impose
taxes at ideal rates. One then could identify a rate within the range as a
neutral target (assuming it could be identified), acknowledging that the target
rate functions as a proxy for the range itself.
As an initial matter, the notion that wide variations in tax burdens are
due to technical or other factors appears to be inconsistent with reality, as
widely varying tax burdens measured as a percentage of GDP obtain among
countries not apparently under external or technical constraints to tax. As
examples, the U.S. combined burden is approximately 26.9 percent, while
larger Western European countries tend to impose levels nearer to 40
percent, and Scandinavian countries hover in the mid- to high- 40 percent
range.9 3 Further, the assumption that states would, if they could, seek to
maximize the returns to privately-held capital within a range faces the
technical difficulty that the optimal ratio of public to private investment for
such a purpose is likely to depend on a variety of country-specific factors.
Therefore, it cannot be specified as a uniform world rate. As examples, in
order to optimize the exploitation of local resources, different countries may
face different requirements for defense spending per capita; for state-funded
roads, waterways, and other infrastructure; and for educational outlays.
Therefore, uniformity in initial starting point will have to be absent unless
one assumes that the initial rate is set to meet a worldwide optimal revenue
target and that extra collections in some jurisdictions are transferred to other
jurisdictions in order to ensure that adequate tax amenities are financed
everywhere.
Neither of these solutions solves the problem of identifying a nondouble-tax-affected world. If initial uniformity is lacking because differing
distributions of resources require differing revenue targets (per capita) to
fund the same pre-tax rate of return, then the non-double-tax-affected world
will have to have different after-tax returns in different jurisdictions in order
to preserve the single pre-tax rate of return worldwide. But investors seek to
maximize after-tax, not pre-tax, returns, assuming they have the capacity to
adjust their investments in response to tax variation. (If they lack the
capacity, then the problem of tax non-neutrality does not arise anyway.)
Consequently, they will arrange their affairs to maximize their after-tax
revenue, replicating the problem that the solution is designed to address.
If, instead, a single rate with transfer payments is assumed, then a
well-formulated model of the non-double-tax-affected world results (if one is
willing to accept the imprecision arising from the fact that states may have
different tastes for tax-financed amenities within a range). However, this
93. Figures are from OECD tax database and are for 2008. OECD Tax
Database, OECD Table A, http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3746,en 2649
34533_19424601_1_1_1,00.html.
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approach assumes away the problem, since it is the existence of distinct,
autonomous jurisdictions that gives rise to the actual problem that analyses
of neutrality are designed to address. That is, the problem is how to move
towards tax neutrality in a system of sovereign nations that, if they cooperate
at all, tend to do so through quite limited means, such as bilateral treaties that
are not enforceable through any supra-national authority. The assumption of
tax transfer payments coordinated worldwide in effect reformulates the
problem as one for a single, closed economy.
Finally, even if one assumes both that states generally agree that
optimal tax rates are those that maximize the return to privately-held capital
and that a single rate for all countries could reasonably approximate that
optimal rate, it turns out that what is meant by tax neutrality cannot be
specified without also articulating an optimal rate. From this perspective,
distortions would not be measured by the extent to which patterns of
investment in the actual world differ from those that would obtain if some
version of territoriality or worldwide taxation were implemented, without
absolute adjustments in rates. Rather, distortions would have to include a
measure of the departure of tax revenue in any particular jurisdiction from
what would be necessary to maximize the return to privately-held capital
there. As an example, if it turned out that the optimal rate was uniform but,
say, 45 percent, then even if every jurisdiction imposed tax at the same rate,
there would be tax distortions unless that rate happened to be 45 percent.
Such an approach is inconsistent with the idea that the non-double-taxaffected world is the world of existing pre-tax returns, coupled with a single
level of tax.
3. ThirdPossibleApproach: From Closed to Open Economies

A third approach would begin from the well-defined case of a set of
closed economies in each of which income taxes are levied at a rate based
upon a prior decision about desired. levels of tax-financed amenities. Within
the framework of the problem as traditionally posed - how to preserve the
neutrality associated with a single level of tax in the cross-border setting this approach is superior to the prior two because the starting point is welldefined and apparently tax-neutral; it is in fact the same starting point that is
used for the analysis of closed economies. In addition, it enjoys a greater
consonance with historical practice, as domestic economies historically have
dwarfed international economies in size.94
94. According to the director general of the World Trade Organization,
between 1950 and 2010, world trade grew from approximately 5.5 percent to

approximately 29 percent of world GDP. Pascal Lamy, Facts and Fictions in
International Trade Economics, Speech at Conference on Trade and Inclusive

Organization

(Apr.

12,

2010), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/s geneva20l1/
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In this setting, the question becomes whether and how one can
preserve the initial neutrality when borders are opened. It will be seen that
what is called neutrality - namely, the removal of tax effects across some
specified margin - is compromised once cross-border trade is introduced,
unless elasticity along the margin of behavior is not associated with
redirection from one jurisdiction to another of either tax revenues or burdens
that are paid for with them. In particular, as capital moves or levels of
economic activity adjust with the opening of borders, two developments
occur: tax revenues in each affected jurisdiction diverge from the target that
was set initially (and that was associated with a prior decision about desired
productivity levels), and the burden on infrastructure shifts as economic
activity increases or declines in the jurisdiction. If either of these changes
(that is, burdens or tax collections) while the other does not move in concert,
pre-tax rates of return will shift because of the non-correspondence between
tax revenues and the requisite supply of tax amenities. If both change (as
typically will be the case in a world in which taxes are not of the lump-sum
variety) the net effect is uncertain. In most cases, however, because both the
resulting effect of changes in tax revenue on capital productivity and the shift
in burdens on tax-financed amenities can be large, the divergence from the
closed-economy baseline that results has a significant impact on both preand post-tax rates of return and consequently on the level of taxes necessary
to maintain the previously set baseline. The feedback effect of tax-induced
capital flows on tax revenues and, ultimately, on the productivity of factors
of production makes it impossible to articulate a neutrality standard
compatible with cross-border trade among distinct, sovereign tax
jurisdictions, as long as one models taxes as pure costs that purchase literally
nothing.
These ideas can be made clearer with the aid of a discussion
example. Thus, consider a system of two states, A and B, in which the
economies initially are closed. Pursuant to their own internal political
processes, each state selects a level of tax amenities and a tax base and rate
designed to supply those amenities in a reasonably efficient manner. State A
taxes at a high average rate, devotes much of its tax revenue to building
institutions and infrastructure and, in consequence, has a high level of
productivity, expressed as GDP per capita. State B taxes at a low rate and has
a correspondingly lower level of productivity. The question is what happens
when borders are opened and capital flows from one jurisdiction to the other.

refdocs/IADs/Facts%20and%2OFictions%20in%20Intemational%2Trade%2Econ
omics%20(WTO%20-%2OApr%202010).pdf.
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(i) Non-Preservationof Savings Neutrality

Suppose that A and B adopt systems of territorial taxation on the
basis that they wish to promote savings neutrality. Savings neutrality, it will
be recalled, holds when all investors face the same after-tax return to
savings. When that criterion is met, it is not possible for total global welfare
to be improved by reallocating some savings from investors in low-tax
jurisdictions to investors in high-tax jurisdictions (or vice-versa). 95
Worldwide allocations of goods to savings and consumption are asserted to
be Pareto-optimal. 96
By the terms of the standard analysis,97 universal territorial systems
satisfy savings neutrality because they cause capital to flow from high-tax to
low-tax jurisdictions until the after-tax return to savings everywhere is the
same. In the stylized world under consideration here, when borders are
opened, capital is expected to flow from A to B as investors reap the benefits
of lower taxes there, which make the after-tax rate of return higher. As
capital flows out of A and into B, its relative supply in the former drops and
in the latter rises, causing, respectively, an increase and a decline in after-tax
rates of return to capital in the two jurisdictions relative to the rates in effect
immediately prior to the opening of borders. The flow continues until aftertax rates equalize, at which point equilibrium is reached and the economic
return on the decision to save or invest is the same in A and B. Savings
neutrality, under this view, is preserved.
The standard analysis disregards the fact that if capital begins to flow
from A to B, then, under territorial taxation, A's tax revenues will drop, and,
over time, the level of tax-financed amenities in A will drop as well. The
drop in amenities will lower the pre-tax and after-tax rates of return to
investment in A apart from any effect caused by changes in the relative
supplies of factors of production there. That is, the drop in amenities will
lower the value of A-sited assets in real terms. (Note that if A raises its rates
to compensate for the reduction in tax revenue, the incentive to move capital
out of A to B becomes greater, undermining the effectiveness of the revenueraising measure.) B's tax revenues will rise with parallel but opposite effects.
In this setting, it is not clear what significance there is to the
resulting neutrality in savings decisions. The asserted efficiency property of
savings neutrality is that it prevents taxes from differentially influencing
investors' decisions to allocate more or less than they would to savings in the
absence of taxes, or, more accurately, in the absence of lump-sum taxes.
The result qualifies as efficient on the standard assumption that non-tax95. Altshuler, Recent Developments, supra note 36, at 257.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Shaheen, Reconsiderations,supra note 14, at 211.
98. Altshuler, Recent Developments, supra note 36, at 257.
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affected decisions maximize productivity, because they are based on real
market prices, not tax-affected prices. 99 Implicit in this formulation is that all
tax effects on market prices represent distortions, or, put otherwise, that taxes
purchase nothing. The conclusion does not hold, however, if real, (pre-tax)
market prices depend on inputs that are supplied with taxes. Stated in the
converse, if tax amenities contribute to productivity, then real market prices
are not given by pre-tax prices, but by those prices plus some portion of
assessed taxes, which means that the payment of taxes contributes to the
value, not just the price, of the good purchased.
In the closed economy setting, this truth was implicitly
acknowledged in the recognition that taxes were necessary, but it was
disregarded on the basis that tax revenues were supplied through lump-sum
taxation. With lump-sum taxation, neither the real tax price of goods (the
cost of providing tax amenities) nor the real tax benefit to goods (the value
received for that tax price in the form of enhanced productivity) is
impounded into prices; taxes are determined and assessed separately from
the economic activity that gives rise to the need for tax revenues. Where both
the supply of tax revenue and the demand for tax benefits may be taken as
fixed, as they are in the closed economy setting, this separation poses little
difficulty, at least from the perspective of articulating a model that reaches a
stable equilibrium.' 0 0 In the real-world, open economy setting where goods
and taxes flow across borders, things are different. Neither the supply of tax
payments nor the demand for tax benefits can be taken as fixed. The supply
of tax payments is not fixed because taxes are not assessed on a lump-sum
basis. The demand for tax benefits is not fixed because the flow of capital
across borders and fluctuations in productivity resulting from ownership
shifts alter the burden on infrastructure in each jurisdiction and thereby alter
the productivity of factors of production there as well. Each of these effects
poses problems for efficiency analysis, because they cause actual revenue
received to diverge from the revenue target required to maintain a given rate
of (pre-tax) return. Indeed, the fact that the demand for tax benefits adjusts in
response to economic activity means that distortions would arise as borders
were opened even in a world in which all taxes were of the lump-sum
variety.
Returning to the discussion example, once it is acknowledged that
taxes purchase part of the return to savings - that is, that taxes are not
merely a cost added on to the price of savings - it is not possible to
maintain that the identity of after-tax returns to savings is efficient if tax
revenues or the burdens on infrastructure have been redirected from one
99. See supra Part III.A.

100. It does, however, introduce a distortion by failing to incorporate into
the cost of goods their tax prices, which results in over-production. See supra Part
III.C.
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jurisdiction to another along the way. The efficiency produced by ensuring
that investment decisions do not differ on substitution grounds from what
they would be in pre-tax terms holds only when it is possible to assume that
tax benefits will be separately supplied at the level necessary to support the
pre-tax rate of return. It is that assumption that makes what are called nontax-affected decisions efficient, because it is that assumption that authorizes
backing out the tax cost of goods and the tax benefit purchased for them
from their market prices (i.e., representing ideal taxes as lump-sum taxes).
The redirection of tax revenues and burdens on infrastructure from one
jurisdiction to another in the open economy setting violates the assumption.
In order to assess the efficiency properties in that setting, one can no longer
assume (if one ever could) that the non-tax-affected world provides a
benchmark of efficiency because, as demonstrated above, its efficiency
properties depend upon a fixed demand for tax benefits. It is the assumption
of a fixed demand for tax benefits, itself following from the assumption that
taxes are a pure cost, that ensures the Pareto-optimality of non-tax-affected
decision making. That same assumption is both necessary to justify backing
out tax costs and factually inaccurate, as reflected in the statement of the
problem itself: different revenue targets produce different levels of taxfinanced amenities.
Thus, consider what happens over time as capital flows and tax
revenues adjust in the example. The real return to savings will be enhanced
in B, the low-tax jurisdiction, as increased tax revenues improve the privatesector pre-tax rate of return there, causing increased investment. This
development produces the seemingly odd result that tax-induced behavior
causes an increase in productivity, not a reduction. The result is odd if one
assumes that taxes are a pure cost, but perfectly sensible if one assumes that
taxes buy something, even if only part of what they buy is something
acquired in the good produced. Capital that remains in A becomes less
productive, which means the same physical quantity of capital drops in value
compared to the value it had in the pre-trade (not pre-tax) world. The
resident of A nominally gets the same return on A-sited investment as the
resident of B does on B-sited investment, but the resident of A has less to
invest in real terms. The opposite effect in B, however, should be larger if B
started with a lower level of tax amenities and lower productivity.' 0'
On balance, it is not clear whether savings decisions in the resulting
post-trade world are superior to the decisions that would be made if savings
neutrality did not hold. To see this, assume the same facts, except that A and
B satisfy all revenue requirements via lump-sum taxation. When borders are
opened, capital will flow from B to A because of the superior return there. If
that were the sole effect, optimum savings decisions would result when rates
equalized. But the inflow of capital to A will impose an additional burden on
101. See infra Part IV.
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A's infrastructure, causing the revenue target to fall short of what is needed
to maintain its higher productivity. The opposite effect will occur in B. If
revenue targets are not adjusted, then in real terms asset prices in A will drop
and in B will increase. After-tax rates of return, however, will be identical in
both jurisdictions. If some tax revenue were allocated from B to A (or if
some capital were reallocated from A back to B), greater overall productivity
would result, meaning that the world of lump-sum taxes is not Paretooptimal. This implies that the non-tax-affected world is inferior to the taxaffected world.
Such an allocation in fact is what occurs under territorial taxation.
When capital moves from A to B in the original example, tax revenue is
redirected from A to B. Productivity in B is increased, resulting in a taxaffected world that is superior to the non-tax-affected world given that B
began with fewer tax amenities than A.
(ii) Non-PreservationofProductionNeutrality
Similar conceptual difficulties arise if A and B instead pursue CEN,
or identity of pre-tax returns, through a system of residence-based taxation
with a FTC. In this case, as capital flows from A to B, A initially will retain
some revenue on its residents' B-sited investments, and there may be only
slight adjustments to the levels of tax-financed amenities in A in
consequence; indeed, the adjustments could go either way depending on the
relative reductions in A's tax revenue and the demand for it to pay for tax
amenities in A at the rate that was chosen before borders were opened.
However, the indifference of A's investors to tax rates in B (at least up to
A's rate) gives B an incentive to raise rates and improve its tax amenities,
thereby increasing the pre-tax rate of return in B and, as a result, attracting
more capital to B. The increase in B's productivity will then reduce the
residual tax revenue available in A to finance tax amenities there especially since more capital also will be attracted to B as a result of its
improved productivity. Again, the result is reduced productivity in A. And,
just as in the territorial case, despite the fact that the relevant benchmark is
satisfied (here, CEN, or identity on pre-tax rates of return), it is clear that tax
rules have caused locational adjustments that affect pre-tax rates of return in
absolute terms, which were supposed to be preserved under CEN. Therefore,
it again is not clear what the normative significance is of satisfying the
benchmark. Nor, conversely, is it clear why the fact that the tax law has
induced locational adjustments means that the resulting state of affairs is
distorted: The pre-tax rate of return in A and B, which was supposed to
function as a baseline to measure tax distortions, has itself been shifted in
both jurisdictions, while the effect of tax-induced capital flows has been to
increase productivity overall. One again is left with the odd result that taxinduced flows of capital - that is, "distortions" - have resulted in greater
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rather than less productivity. Indeed, tax-induced flows even have resulted in
greater rather than less efficiency over all, when the latter is understood to
include the realization of latent productive power available to capital and
labor.
(iii) Comparison
Neutralities

With

Ownership

and

Competitive

Capital ownership neutrality offers a useful contrast to savings
neutrality and production neutrality on the question of the effects of taxation
on productivity. The case for pursuing CON over other benchmarks rests in
large part on the contention that tax-induced ownership effects dominate
capital location and savings-spending decision effects.' 0 To the extent the
facts support this contention, the feedback effects just discussed are muted,
because tax rules generally do not redirect tax revenues into or out of
jurisdictions if capital doesn't move. There may, however, be adjustments on
the demand side for tax amenities even if the location of factors of
production is fixed, meaning that some feedback effect may occur.
Thus, consider again the example of States A and B as borders open,
but assume that the only tax-sensitive margin is ownership. In the first
scenario, both A and B adopt territorial systems. One would expect
ownership shifts to occur as borders are opened, and, if one supposes that
better tax amenities reliably produce greater competencies, it seems that in
an initial stage there will be a net shift of ownership of B-sited assets to A
residents. Because gains from non-tax-affected trade can be expected to
increase output over all, one would expect tax revenue increases in B as Bsited assets become more profitable. However, as long as there is not a net
reduction in productivity of assets remaining in A (by whoever held), tax
revenue should not decline in A either.
Whether A-sited assets remain as productive as before depends on
what happens when A residents acquire more-profitable assets in B. The
CON story plausibly holds that when resident investors acquire foreign-sited
assets, new owners enter to fill the void created by the investor's decision to
sell property at home in order to finance the foreign acquisition.103 It does
not follow that the new investors of the residence-sited assets will be as
effective as the old owners, but a guess based purely on intuition is that the
long-run tax revenue differences would not be large. If, however, intuition
fails and there is a material net reduction, then tax revenue would decline,
much as in the case where it is assumed that capital is mobile and ownership
is fixed.

102. Desai & Hines, EvaluatingInt'l Tax Reform, supra note 50, at 499.
103. Hines, Reconsidering,supra note 19, at 277-78.
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If A and B each adopt a worldwide FTC system, it would appear that
the effect would be more muted still, because residual residence-based tax
remains when ownership shifts from low-tax to high-tax residents.
These considerations suggest that it is an empirical question whether
tax revenue streams or burdens on tax-financed infrastructure will be
dramatically affected by tax rules. As indicated above, there is wide
disagreement on the question of which margins of investor behavior, if any,
dominate in response to tax rules.10
Finally, a word on competitive neutrality. As discussed in Part II,
treating "competitive neutrality" as a genuine neutrality benchmark seems
mistaken because there are no efficiency losses, other than those associated
with savings non-neutrality, that result from failure to ensure that home and
host residents face identical tax burdens on host-sited investment. Not
surprisingly, there are no implications for competitive neutrality from the
fact that capital will move in response to lower rates (assuming capital
location is responsive to tax considerations). Competitive neutrality says
nothing explicitly or implicitly about relative productivity in home and host.
C Neutrality Reformulated
1. Inadequaciesof the Lump-Sum Ideal

The preceding considerations highlight the infirmities of neutrality
analysis when it proceeds on the basis that taxes represent a pure cost
unrelated to the provision of contingently demanded benefits. Yet even the
statement of the problem of tax neutrality for the closed economy setting, in
which the decision on a revenue target is treated as exogenously given,
represents an acknowledgment that some, perhaps most, taxes fund benefits
that may or may not be provided and that are in some measure associated
with identifiable, optional benefits. Put simply: most taxes pay for goods that
are necessary only if a given level of productivity is desired. If that were not
the case, there would be little reason for different levels of tax to be
associated with different productivity levels.
To the extent taxes fund such optional benefits, the lump-sum ideal
is incorrect. Recall that the ideal supposes at Stage One that tax revenues are
financed from without, so that the individuals who benefit from tax revenues
bear no cost whatever in supplying them. A level of economic activity then
arises that is Pareto-optimal under these conditions. By definition, that level
is the one such that the cost of engaging in any more activity just equals the

104. See, e.g., Kane, Considering "Reconsidering,"supra note 72, at 310;
Stephen E. Shay, Commentary, Ownership Neutrality and PracticalComplications,

62 TAX L. REv. 317, 319-24 (2009).
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benefit of doing so. 10 5 In other words, economic activity is supplied until the
cost of doing so just equals the benefit. After that point, the costs of any
additional economic activity exceed the benefits - for example, in forgone
leisure - and thus additional economic activity does not occur. This result
follows simply from the rational, utility-maximizing behavior of economic
actors.
Stage Two of the basic model then supposes that taxes are imposed
on the same economic actors on a lump-sum basis in order to meet the
associated revenue target. The result is asserted to be maximally efficient. In
other words, the introduction of lump-sum taxes paid by those who enjoy
their benefits is assumed not to affect the Pareto optimality of the result at
Stage One, when tax revenues were supplied from without. Now, in order for
Stage Two to be Pareto-optimal given that Stage One is, there must be no
incremental costs that individuals bear in supplying tax revenues used to
finance the last increment of economic activity. If that were not the case,
then it would be possible to improve things by avoiding the cost and not
supplying the associated activity, as it is known that the benefit from the
activity is just equal to the cost that was incurred before there was any cost to
supplying tax revenue. But it is clear that there are incremental costs to
supplying tax revenues, inasmuch as taxes cause wealth reductions to those
who pay them. This implies that economic activity is inefficiently oversupplied in the standard model.
One can restate the point as follows: the Pareto optimality of Stage
Two follows only if the cost in taxes of the last bit of activity undertaken
when tax revenues were free is zero. But that would be the case only if it
were not possible to associate activities with identifiable, tax-financed
burdens. Clearly, however, almost any activity creates burdens that are paid
for with taxes. One can't get the pin from Manchester to London without a
road, but if one doesn't need to get the pin from Manchester to London, one
may not need the road, or at least not one that good. For that reason, some
portion of the burden can be forgone simply by forgoing the activity.106
Since the last amount of many activities had economic value only on the
assumption that there was no tax cost to them, it follows that things would be
improved by not engaging in those last amounts once a tax cost is added in,
rather than assessing that portion of the (lump-sum) tax and then engaging in
the economic activity.
The argument does not imply that taxes function precisely like
payments for identifiable benefits. It implies only that, for the overwhelming
105. KARL E. CASE, ECONOMICS AND TAX POLICY 117-118 (Oelgeschlager,
Gunn, & Hain, Publishers, Inc.) (1986). [hereinafter CASE, EcoNOMICs].
106. See Roin, Competition, supra note 7, at 555-62, for an extended
discussion of the relevance of benefits that taxes purchase to an analysis of the
problem of tax competition.
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share of economic activity, there is some identifiable burden imposed that is
paid for with taxes. The lump-sum model denies this, supposing instead that
taxes pay for an entirely different kind of good from that supplied through
private markets. It supposes, that is, that every benefit paid for with taxes
exceeds the tax cost. Whereas markets are the setting in which costs are
impounded into identifiable goods for which purchasers are fully charged,
taxes are the setting in which costs are necessary but do not supply anything
identifiable at all. The truth is that most taxes finance activities that fall
somewhere in between.
2. Neutrality Modeling Consequences

The core of the neutrality concept is the idea that costs are perfectly
internalized to those who impose them and associated benefits are
correlatively enjoyed. o0 Indeed, the efficiency properties even of private
markets rest on the assumption that they effectively impound costs to private
actors.108 Thus, the main implication of the considerations here for the
analysis of tax neutrality in the cross-border setting is that an adequate
conception of neutrality would need to reflect the extent to which various
activities result in costs or benefits that are not otherwise internalized to the
actor. What I have been referring to as the standard model of efficiency in
taxation purports to satisfy that assumption by treating taxes as funding
activities the benefits of which are so diffuse and yet so necessary that every
dollar of tax revenue up to the last dollar collected finances a benefit greater
than its cost.109 Therefore, the entire revenue target is taken to represent a
cost that is somehow necessary for both any and every benefit that derives
from economic activity. For the reasons explored in Section I of this
Subpart, that assumption is inaccurate. Indeed, as stated at the outset, if the
assumption were true it would not be possible to make sense of the fact that
different levels of taxation are associated with different levels of economic
activity - that is, with the basic framing of the problem of international tax
neutrality (or, indeed, of neutrality generally).
By the same token, as an ideal, the benefit model of taxation is at
least as inaccurate as the standard model. Taxes pay for benefits that are
enjoyed much more diffusely than are most benefits purchased in private
markets. The fact that one needs a good road only if one needs to get the pin
from Manchester to London does not imply that only the producer of the pin
(or, ultimately, its beneficial purchaser) benefits from the road. Again, most
107. See CASE, ECONOMICs, supra note 105, at 121.

108. Id.
109. Again, it should be borne in mind that the tax revenues of relevance

here are what I have termed "amenity taxes," not taxes, for example, to fund
redistribution or pure consumption goods.
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benefits that are purchased with taxes have this character. If that were not the
case, benefits supplied with taxes instead could be supplied through private
markets. So a model of neutrality that accurately accounted for the burdens
that economic activity creates can no more be assimilated to a market model
than to the standard model; rather, it would need to identify that portion of
burdens that any particular activity creates that are imposed diffusely and
then accurately assign the cost of the activity to each individual beneficiary
of it. In other words, it would require assigning to individual economic
activities the otherwise-externalized costs that they create so that the tax
could be assessed to the actor.
As a practical matter, there is no way to do this. Consider that if the
improvements to the Manchester-London road are enjoyed more widely than
by the pin producer (as they assuredly are), then to preserve neutrality, it is
not just the pin producer who needs to be made responsible for the better
road; it is a larger, more diffuse group, and one would need some way to
identify that group's members and "how much" each member benefited in
order to assign tax liabilities accurately. A vast literature on the pricing of
such public goods, originating with the work of Erik Lindahl, 1o has grown
up over the last century in an effort to answer these questions. Its main
conclusion is that the problem is largely intractable as a practical matter,
even if it is possible in some cases to articulate theoretically how such goods
The main theoretical problem is that, to the extent a
should be priced.
benefit is non-rival and non-excludible, no one has an incentive to disclose
his true valuation of the good; rather each has an incentive to give an
artificially low signal for the price of the good, because, if the good is
supplied, each will be able to enjoy it without having to pay for it.112 Added
to this core difficulty are the problems of identifying who benefits, which
activities burden, and by how much.
In light of these difficulties, one could abandon the aspiration to
evaluate the productivity consequences of international tax systems on the
basis that it is simply not possible to identify a neutral baseline against which
to measure distortions that adversely affect productivity. An alternative,
which I pursue in the next two parts, is to take an aggregative approach that
assumes that tax revenues are associated with economic productivity at a
macro-level that can be modeled in a relatively simple manner. The object is
110. See Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Casefor ProportionateTaxation, 2
L. REV. 157, 168-72 (1999) [hereinafter Fried, Proportionate Taxation]
(discussing the literature on pricing of public goods initiated by Lindahl).
111. Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV.
OF ECON. & STAT. 387, 388-89 (1954) [hereinafter Samuelson, Pure Theory]. See

CHAP

also, Fried, Proportionate Taxation, supra note 110, at 165-72 (discussing the

literature).
112. Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 111, at 388-89.
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to get a rough idea of the extent to which expenditures on tax-financed types
of benefits contribute to productivity. Part IV develops a model that offers
some useful hypotheses about the likely productivity properties of
international tax systems. Implications of the hypotheses are explored in Part
V.

IV.

NEUTRALITY AS A COMBINATION OF RATES AND AMENITIES

This Part and the next attempt to quantify the conceptual points
developed in Parts III.B and III.C. The extent of the effect of tax rules on
productivity depends on the nature of the relationship between tax revenues
and tax amenities. In this Part, I begin with a simple model that offers rough
measures of that relationship and of the magnitude of the effect on tax
revenues from tax-induced capital flows. I then explore the consequences for
productivity under the model when capital enters or leaves the jurisdiction in
response to taxes. The object here is not to predict what is likely to happen to
actual flows under possible real-world conditions (a topic addressed in Part
V), but rather to explore the efficiency and productivity of properties of tax
systems, assuming that certain flows of tax revenues and of productive
activities occur and that these flows are affected by whatever set of tax rules
is in place.
A. Estimatingthe Value of Tax Amenities

Technically the question of interest is what quantity of those taxfinanced governmental goods and services that contribute to productivity
needed to support a given level of productivity. I have been referring to these
goods as "tax amenities." Redistributive taxation and taxation for the
provision of what might be called pure consumption benefits, such as public
parks for enjoyment, are not relevant to this question.
The precise relationship between tax amenities and productivity
undoubtedly is quite complex and varies depending on such factors as the
size of the jurisdiction, its available resources, social and political views
about various matters, and other variables. Rather than seek to tease out the
relationships between these factors and productivity, I proceed with a more
tractable, if less precise, model that seeks to specify the general nature of the
relationship between taxation and productivity.
It is helpful to begin with the observation that most tax amenities
exhibit characteristics somewhere between those of "pure private goods" and
"pure public goods." A pure private good is one whose unit price can be
determined under a standard model of supply and demand; it exhibits no
externalities and its producer bears all associated costs and enjoys all
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associated benefits of producing it. 1 13 Pure private goods also exhibit the
characteristics of "excludability" and "rivalry," meaning, respectively, that
the good's availability can be limited to those who pay for it and that one
person's consumption of the supply of the good reduces its availability for
consumption by another.
A pure public good, by contrast, would be entirely non-rival and
non-excludable. 4 National defense is close to a pure public good because
militias provide a benefit to all residents without regard to the amounts of tax
they pay that support national defense and, within limits, without regard to
population size. Clean air is a similar example. For these goods, it is
impossible to exclude those who do not pay for them from enjoying them,
and the enjoyment of them by anyone (whether paying or not) does not
reduce the quantity available for others to enjoy.
In practice, most tax-financed goods exhibit some aspects of nonrivalry and non-excludability, but they are not "pure." 115 (The converse holds
to some extent as well: many market-supplied goods have public-goods
features, in that they provide benefits to persons who do not pay for them.)1 16
Locally provided amenities such as street cleaning or schools exhibit less of
these characteristics, since ordinary market forces, such as the cost of
housing, may determine who gets to enjoy the benefits. A public school may
be open only to community residents (excludability), and there are limits to
the number of attendees (rivalry).
It is well understood that public goods cannot be priced under the
standard model applicable to private goods because of endemic market
failure, which takes the form of positive externalities.17 In particular, nonexcludability creates a free-rider problem in that the goods are enjoyed by
non-purchasers, and non-rivalry means that pricing presents a collective
action problem.118 As a consequence, the use of market mechanisms to
supply public goods will result in a systematic undersupply unless there is
someone who so values the good that it is worthwhile for that person to
provide it even if no compensation from other beneficiaries is forthcoming.
A large literature explores the problem of funding public goods in a manner
that addresses these difficulties. 119

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.

116. As one example among many, local real property enhancements may
improve property values in the surrounding area.
117. Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 111, at 388-89.
118. Id.
119. John Hudson & Philip Jones, "Public Goods ": An Exercise In
Calibration, 124 PUB. CHOICE 267 (2005).
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Although the pricing of public goods is relevant to the problem of
their supply, here the concern is not so much with setting prices but with
determining the value they add to factors of production via tax amenities.
What, in general, does it cost to supply a given level of productivity, and
how is that cost related to the quantity of capital in the jurisdiction, assuming
that all tax amenities are financed with tax revenues?
If tax amenities were pure private goods, the feedback problem of
tax-induced capital flows on tax revenues and, consequently, on tax
amenities would disappear. In that case, each unit of capital would be
ticketed with just the taxes that it requires in order to be as productive as it is
for a given rate of tax, and not more. Net capital exports would reduce total
taxes collected and, concomitantly, total tax amenities supplied by exactly
the amount no longer needed in the jurisdiction to maintain the same level of
capital productivity, while net capital imports would increase tax amenities
analogously. But tax amenities, even though narrowly construed to include
solely those tax-purchased goods that contribute to the productivity of
capital, are not pure private goods, and the cost of providing them cannot be
assumed to be linearly impounded into taxes assessed on capital. Many tax
amenities, such as national defense or the broadcast spectrum, have costs that
are not systematically related to the quantity of capital in the jurisdiction.
Other tax amenities, such as a court system, public safety, and transportation
infrastructure, have costs that are partly related and partly unrelated to the
quantity of capital present in the jurisdiction. More generally, it seems
reasonable to suppose that for a given level of capital productivity, tax
amenities will be supplied partly from public goods financed with fixed costs
and partly from public goods the cost of which varies in some way with the
amount of capital in the jurisdiction.
1. Model

Equation (1) attempts to capture these intuitions in a simple, stylized
model that relates GDP per capita, a proxy for capital productivity, to the
product of the logarithms of total taxes collected per capita and country
population, backing out, however, taxes paid for pension contributions. The
underlying intuitions are as follows:
i.

over the range of reasonable possible tax burdens, taxes are
positively correlated with capital productivity because taxes pay
for infrastructure;
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ii. by backing out the largest single item (retirement) that is largely
unrelated to productivity, a reasonable approximation of taxes
used to fund productive activity is employed;120
iii. especially in the case of public goods, there are returns to scale
for larger countries so that, all else equal, the same quantity of
tax revenue per capita will fund more tax amenities in a country
with a larger population than in a country with a smaller one;
and
iv. the use of logarithm functions is appropriate because both the
marginal benefit from greater tax burdens and the marginal
benefit from greater population exhibit the property common to
many economic inputs of being constantly declining, so that the
next dollar of tax revenue or the next person does not contribute
as much as the previous one to the improvement of GDP per
capita.
Thus:
GDP,= logn(T + C;)*logn(Pi+ C2),
(1)
where GDP, is gross domestic product per capita as a share of a reference
GDP per capita, T is tax revenue per capita as a share of reference tax
revenue per capita, and P is population as a share of reference population, in
each case in Country i. The C-terms are constants. Reference rates are used
to avoid the problem of expressing relative productivity levels and tax
burdens in dollars or other units.
Because the model attempts to derive the consequences of
international tax rules on productivity as economies move from relatively
closed to more open status, an older data set is a better candidate than a
newer one for an approximation of the relationship between tax revenue and
population on one hand and productivity on the other for a closed economy.
The earliest year for which data are readily available is 1980. At that time,
the value of world trade as a percentage of world GDP was 42.1 percent. (By
2007 this value had risen to 62.1 percent. 121) Expressing total taxes in
Country i as a fraction of U.S. total taxes in 1980 (in each case, less pension
contributions) and population in Country i as a fraction of U.S. population in
120. Additional outlays that could have been backed out include
unemployment insurance, public consumption goods, such as parks, and transfer
payments from high-income to low-income persons. The first and third of these
items plausibly contribute materially to productivity, while the second is generally
inconsequential in amount. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC., OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR

2010 (proposing $12 billion, or approximately 0.8 percent of the federal budget, for
the Department of the Interior).
121. International Monetary Fund, Globalization: A Brief Overview,
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/ib/2008/053008.htm.
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1980, a regression for then-member OECD countries against the exponent of
GDP per capita (expressed as a fraction of U.S. GDP per capita) was run for
1980.
The parameters derived for the regression are: C = 1.3228, and C2
= 2.4750. The two independent variables appear to account for
approximately 79 percent of the variation in GDP/capita, although tax
revenue per capita alone accounts for nearly 65 percent of total variation. 12 3
Substituting these values into Equation (1) yields:
GDP/cap,= logn(T, + 1.2 899)*logn(P + 2.9285),

(1')

where GDP/cap is expressed in terms of the fraction of U.S. GDP per capita,
Ti is expressed as the fraction of total U.S. tax revenue, and P; is expressed as
a fraction of U.S. population, all in 1980. Total tax revenue includes both
income and other taxes and includes sub-national tax revenue. Table 1 lists
predicted productivity levels under Equation (1') associated with different
levels of tax revenue for selected populations and tax revenue values.

122. The data set consisted of all OECD member countries in 1980 except
Iceland, Luxembourg, and Sweden. Iceland and Luxembourg were excluded because
they were judged too small in population to be representative, while Switzerland was
excluded because it was judged to be a tax haven and, therefore, unlikely to exhibit
the properties of a relatively closed economy funding its infrastructure primarily
with taxes from domestic productive activity. Additional attributes of the data set
and results for statistical significance are provided in the Appendix.
123. R2 for Equation (1') is 0.7979. See Appendix.
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Table 1: Productivity at Selected Tax Revenues and Populations
a. PopulationEqual to U.S. Population (1980)
Tax revenue per capita as
percent U.S. tax revenue
per

Predicted GDP per capita as
percent U.S. GDP per capita

capita

200

162.91

180

154.33

160

145.16

140

135.36

120

124.79

100

113.34

80

100.84

60

87.08

40

71.77

20

54.54

b. PopulationEqual to One-Half U.S. Population(1980)
Tax revenue per capita as
percent U.S. tax revenue
per

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20

Predicted GDP per capita as
percent U.S. GDP per capita

capita

139.19
131.86
124.04
115.65
106.62
96.83
86.15
74.40
61.32
46.60
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PopulationEqual to One-Twentieth U.S. Population(1980)

Tax revenue per capita as
percent U.S. tax revenue
per

Predicted GDP per capita as
percent U.S. GDP per capita

capita

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60

121.25
114.87
108.05
100.75
92.88
84.36
75.05
64.81

9.

40

53.42

10.

20

40.60

2.

Observations

With coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.798, the model may be
taken as identifying a meaningful correlation between productivity on one
hand and tax amenities and population on the other. As with any model, the
establishment of a correlation does not establish causation: the model does
prove that higher tax rates or larger populations cause greater productivity.
Nonetheless, in considering possible alternative explanations for the
correlation, it would appear that causation more likely runs in this direction
than either in the opposite direction or from some third thing to both
productivity increases on one hand and higher tax rates and larger
populations on the other.
Begin with the alternative thesis that high productivity causes higher
tax rates. The story could be based on the idea that highly productive
countries have a greater taste for tax-financed goods than do less-productive
countries. That account may partly explain a portion of higher tax rates in
some countries -

Scandinavia may be a good example -

but it largely

disregards the fact that most economic activity plainly requires goods that are
paid for with taxes. 124 Moreover, the idea that populations in wealthier
countries generally clamor for higher taxes to fund various programs seems
counter-intuitive. As for the idea that it is some third thing that causes both
productivity and higher taxes, one can only say that it is always possible that
an as-yet unidentified factor explains a correlation; however, no such third
thing readily comes to mind. Rather the fact that so many tax expenditures
124. See, e.g., David Hasen, Liberalism and Ability Taxation, 85 TEX. L.

REv. 1057, 1109 n.203 (2007) (citing literature).
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are devoted to goods that enhance productivity suggests the causation runs
mostly from tax rates to productivity.
Similarly, it would seem that in the end higher populations are more
responsible for higher productivity than the other way around. While greater
productivity may result in higher populations, it seems likely that the
resulting higher population in turn increases productivity. Smaller countries
have fewer opportunities than larger ones to exploit comparative advantage,
and the greater opportunities that larger populations have to diversify factors
of production would suggest that larger countries are more productive than
smaller ones.
The limits of the model also should be noted. The model does not
purport to explain the relationship between rates or population and
productivity at values far outside of observed ranges. Average effective tax
rates near or in excess of 100 percent obviously would not be associated with
higher levels of productivity than are much lower rates, but the model as
formulated does not expressly take this limitation into account, as no country
imposes an average effective tax rate nearly that high. No claim of
explanatory power for rates much outside the range of observed rates (on
either side) is made. The model also does not tease out the effects of different
kinds of taxes on productivity or, more importantly, the effects of
progressivity (or lack of it) on productivity. For example, there likely are
different productivity properties from the imposition of taxes primarily on
income, on income and consumption, and primarily on consumption.
Similarly, there likely are different effects depending upon whether those
with greater incomes (or who consumer more) are taxed more heavily. And,
relatedly, productivity may be related to income or wealth distribution more
generally. The model addresses none of these factors.
Within these limitations, and in light of possible explanations for the
observed correlations, it would appear that over the range of reasonable
average effective rates, higher taxes do tend to cause higher productivity. In
other words, Equation (1') may be interpreted to say that within the range of
reasonable average effective tax rates, over time a higher rate is likely to
result in productivity gains roughly consonant with the pattern of predictions
in Table I.
B. Productivity Consequences of CapitalFlows Under the Model
Whether and how capital will flow as the world moves from a
system of closed economies to one of open economies are topics developed
in Part V, but here it is worth considering in a general way the revenue and
productivity effects that the model predicts assuming that significant
amounts of capital do flow into or out of a representative jurisdiction. Again,
the object in this subpart is simply to get an idea of the relationship between
capital flows and productivity consequences, not to offer claims about the
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particular flows that are likely to result from the feedback effects from either
altered supplies of tax revenues or altered demands for them.
In order to simplify the analysis, the following assumes that all
countries derive one-half of their tax revenues from a flat-rate income tax,
with the balance derived from taxes and fees not dependent upon the
presence of capital in the jurisdiction. It also assumes that one-half of world
income is derived from labor and one-half from capital. This assumption is
one possible approximation of the generally accepted view that labor
accounts for between 40 and 60 percent of GDP, and capital the balance.125
Thus, under these assumptions, one-quarter of world tax revenue derives
from income taxes laid on capital.
1.

TerritorialSystems

In a system of universal territoriality, the flow of capital out of a
jurisdiction is associated in the short term with the elimination of all income
tax revenues generated by the capital from the residence jurisdiction and the
generation of new tax revenue in the source jurisdiction (at the source rate).
It also is associated with the elimination of tax revenue from labor supplied
in conjunction with the operation of that capital in the residence to the extent
the labor is not reabsorbed into the residence economy; additional tax
revenue resulting from the inflow of capital in the source arises on an
analogous basis. 26 Based upon the assumptions described above, and in
light of the associated revenue losses and gains resulting from capital
movements, the exodus of one percent of capital from a jurisdiction leads to
a minimum 0.25 percent reduction in total tax revenues there. Thus, the
transfer of 20 percent of the capital from the residence to a source
jurisdiction is associated with at least a 5 percent reduction in residence tax
revenues.
Consider a country having a population one-twentieth of the U.S.
1980 population whose initial tax revenues per capita are 1.6 times that of
the U.S. in 1980. This would be approximately the situation of a small
Western European country such as Belgium. Assume that, after borders are
opened, over time the country experiences a 25 percent net capital outflow
and an associated 8 percent reduction in tax revenues, factoring in lost
productivity from the sub-optimal reallocation of labor to other activities in
the residence. Although residents would continue to own income generated
by off-shore capital, the residence would experience a reduction in
125. Malte Lilbke, Labour Shares, International Labour Organisation,
Technical Brief No. 1 (2007), http://www.ilo.org/integration/resources/briefs/
WCMS_086237/lang--en/index.htm.
126. DAVID F. HEATHFIELD & SOREN WIBE, AN INTRODUCTION TO COST
AND PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 1-27 (1987).
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productivity of approximately 4.5 percent due solely to reductions in tax
revenues, from 108 percent of U.S. productivity to about 103.5 percent. 12 7
This drop may not appear to be large, but even an economy 5 percent of the
size of the U.S. economy would have approximately $729 billion in annual
GDP,128 meaning that a 4 percent reduction in productivity is associated with
approximately $29 billion in lost productivity, or more than $1,800 per
person per year.
Perhaps more importantly, a further effect of a reduction in incountry capital productivity is to make foreign investment still more
attractive to home-country residents, leading to a cycle of capital exodus that
continues for as long as the reduction in productivity associated with lower
tax revenues exceeds the increase in capital productivity associated with
greater scarcity of capital in the jurisdiction.129 And if the residence responds
to falling productivity by reducing tax rates, the problem is likely to get
worse unless the drop in rates encourages capital inflows. (Whether it does
depends upon the tradeoff to foreign investors between lower productivity in
the residence and lower taxes there. This subject is addressed in Part V.)
Unless and until the drop in rates encourages net capital inflows, residence
productivity will decline further still. When equilibrium is reached, incountry GDP will have declined substantially below the optimum level that
existed before borders were opened. Whether the drop represents a
worldwide productivity loss depends, however, on the capital productivity
increase, if any, associated with the movement of capital into source
jurisdictions and the associated infrastructure improvements resulting from
additional tax revenues there. Of importance for the neutrality question is
127. An 8 percent reduction in tax revenue per capita from 1.6 times the
U.S. level is 1.472 times the U.S. level. Under Equation (1'), the resulting
productivity is given by: logn(1.472 + 1.2899)*logn(0.05 + 2.71828) = 1.034, or
103.4 percent of U.S. productivity, a drop of approximately four-and-one-half
percent from the level for tax revenue per capita equal to 1.6 times that of the U.S.
See Table 1.c., line 3.
128. For 2010, the OECD estimated U.S. GDP as $14.58 trillion. OECD,
Gross Domestic Products in U.S. Dollars, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/
gross-domestic-product-in-us-dollars_2074384x-table3. According to Equation (1'),
a country one-twentieth the size of the U.S. with a per capita tax burden equal to 1.6
times that of the U.S. would have GDP per capita of 99 percent of that of the U.S.,
resulting in an economy approximately 5 percent of the size of the U.S. economy.
129. To be clear, the upward pressure on the price of capital remaining in
the jurisdiction resulting from tax-induced outflows is a consistent theme of
neutrality analysis. See, e.g., Knoll, Int'l Tax Neutrality, supra note 1, at 101-04;
Shaheen, Reconsiderations, supra note 14, at 215-19. The claim here is that the
focus equally needs to be on the downward pressure on the price of capital
remaining in the jurisdiction (relative to the price of capital in other jurisdictions)
that results from the reduced productivity of capital as tax amenities go unsupplied.
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that, however that analysis plays out, one cannot read off from the fact that
capital flows into or out of the jurisdiction that neutrality either has been
"maintained" or has not according to the savings neutrality benchmark.
In the case of a net capital importer, the situation is roughly reversed.
A net 25 percent increase in capital inflow will be associated with a 25
percent increase in tax revenues and rising productivity. Of course, this result
presupposes that tax rates remain generally constant. As discussed in Part V,
below, this expectation is not reasonable in a world of territorial states
divided into net capital exporting countries and net capital importing
countries.
2.

Worldwide Systems

In worldwide systems, the productivity consequences of a net inflow
of capital, without more, do not differ from those in territorial systems, while
the consequences of a net outflow of capital may or may not differ markedly
from those in territorial systems. As in a territorial system, the source
collects its full rate on imported capital, and the associated benefits to tax
amenities all arise there. The productivity consequences in the residence are
more ambiguous. If capital moves to a higher-taxed jurisdiction, the result is
the same as in a territorial system, assuming the FTC is limited: The
residence experiences a net reduction in tax revenues equal to all tax on the
departed capital, giving rise to the same reduction in productivity that arises
under a territorial system. (If the FTC is unlimited, there is an additional
reduction in residence tax revenue equal to the difference between the tax on
income at the source rate and the tax on income at the residence rate,
resulting in even greater degradation of residence productivity. However, as
noted earlier, no system provides or is likely to provide an unlimited
FTC. 130)
If the source jurisdiction taxes at a lower rate than the residence
jurisdiction, the residence retains residual tax revenue equal to the difference
between the residence country and source country rates applied to net sourcebased investment income. The productivity consequences of the retention are
unclear. The model of productivity developed in this Part is based on the
theory that over the range of reasonably possible tax rates, tax revenues
significantly drive the rate of return to privately-held capital. The model
further supposes that, for a variety of reasons, the increase or reduction in
taxes on capital will be related to the logarithm of the pre-tax rate of return.
In other words, if, as capital leaves the jurisdiction, all of the associated tax
revenues leave the jurisdiction, the resultant reduction in tax revenues has a
downward effect on productivity that exceeds the upward effect from having
to supply fewer tax amenities by reason of the reduced quantity of capital
130. See supra Part II.B.
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present there. By the same token, however, the departure of capital from a
jurisdiction does imply that the burden on infrastructure, and consequently
the cost of tax amenities, drops to some extent. Therefore, in a worldwide
system where capital leaves a high-tax residence for a low-tax source, the
effect on residence productivity from reduced tax revenues depends on
whether the residual tax revenue in the residence covers the cost of
maintaining the reduced need for tax amenities there. This is an empirical
question that is a function of a number of variables, including the initial
quantity of tax revenue per capita in the residence (a higher amount
associated with less reduction in productivity as capital leaves), the
difference between the source and resident rates (a greater difference
associated with less reduction in productivity as capital leaves) and the size
of the residence (a larger population associated with less reduction in
productivity as capital leaves). As a general matter, however, one may say
that to the extent tax revenue remains in the residence as capital departs for
the source, the downward effect on residence productivity is muted, while it
may even be the case that there is net increase in productivity.
C Conclusion on Neutrality and Amenities
The discussion in this Part has developed the thesis, backed by
evidence, that the presence in a jurisdiction of what I have termed "tax
amenities" - infrastructure and other public or quasi-public goods that are
paid for with tax revenues - plays a significant role in the productivity of
capital there. The ramifications of the thesis, if true, are reasonably farreaching. Part III developed the argument that any system for taxing crossborder transactions creates incentives that alter the absolute productivity of
capital in any jurisdiction, assuming that capital moves or its ownership is
adjusted, or that tax revenues are reallocated, in response to tax rules.
(Similar consequences follow if labor moves or is reallocated, a question not
treated here.) Changes in absolute productivity in the jurisdiction, no less
than tax-induced movements of assets or capabilities or changes to the
relative supplies of labor and capital, have an effect on the "pre-tax rate of
return" and indicate that productivity enhancements may result from what
would count as tax distortions under the standard view of the effects of
taxation on productivity.
This Part suggests that predictions under the amenity approach about
whether capital will flow and the productivity consequences of capital flows
as borders become more open differ markedly from predictions under the
standard models. Under those models, productivity is not made to depend on
tax revenues, and tax rules accordingly are expected to have effects on
productivity largely because of tax-induced changes in allocations of
resources to the wrong person or place and resulting misallocations of the
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relative supplies of and demands for factors of production in affected
jurisdictions.
Thus, if, when borders are lifted, the world consists of a system of
territorial regimes, under the standard model capital can be expected to flow
to the lowest-tax jurisdictions until after-tax rates of return there reach aftertax rates in the next-lowest-taxed jurisdictions, then to those latter
jurisdictions, finally reaching a single worldwide after-tax rate with some
significant amount of distortion in capital location once all tax benefits have
been capitalized.131 This pattern follows if one assumes that taxes generally
represent a cost laid on top of other costs to investment, with the difference
that, unlike other costs, tax costs purchase nothing that need not be
purchased. Similarly, if ownership is the dominant margin along which
behavior is elastic to taxes and a mixed system of worldwide and territorial
regimes is in effect as borders become open, one can expect the identity of
owners of capital to shift in similar ways until a single after-tax rate of return
is reached with an associated (inefficient) pattern of ownership.132
By contrast, under the approach developed here, it is unclear whether
under a territorial regime capital will flow into low-tax jurisdictions or
ownership will shift from high-tax to low-tax investors: On one hand, for the
resident of a high-tax jurisdiction, the tax burden of investment is lower in a
low-tax jurisdiction; but, on the other hand, the absolute rate of return to
capital in the low-tax jurisdiction is likely to be lower than it is in a high-tax
jurisdiction. Whether it makes sense to move capital or change ownership to
enjoy those lower tax rates depends on the tradeoff between them and the
lower productivity associated with them, since the issue is which
combination of low rates and high amenities produces the highest after-tax
rate of return. This is an empirical question the answer to which depends on
actual productivity levels and tax rates in both jurisdictions.
It is perhaps worth noting that the low levels of capital inflow into
low-tax jurisdictions suggested by a focus on tax amenities is consistent with
observation.133 The theory that generates them also helps to explain the socalled "Lucas Paradox," which states that despite the fact that (standard)
theory predicts net capital flows to low-cost jurisdictions, observed flows
tend to run in the opposite direction - to high-cost jurisdictions.134 It would
131. See, e.g., Rosenzweig, Tax Havens, supra note 11, at 945-47, for a
standard statement of the thesis.
132. See, e.g., Hines, Reconsidering,supra note 19, at 276, for a description
of how ownership changes result from tax rules.
133. Laura Alfaro et al., Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor
Countries? An Empirical Investigation, 90 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 347 (2008).
[hereinafter Alfaro, CapitalFlow]
134. Robert Lucas, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Second
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Why Doesn 't CapitalFlow
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appear that the puzzle can be partly explained, or at least better understood,
once the role that taxes play in establishing productivity is taken into
account. In particular, a jurisdiction's after-tax return to higher taxes will
often, perhaps typically, exceed the after-tax return to lower taxes. For
example, under the model set out in Part IV, a country one-twentieth the size
of the U.S. in population having an initial tax amenity rate equal to 80
percent of the U.S. tax amenity rate in 1980 would have an amenity tax rate
of 20.62 percent 35 and a model-predicted GDP per capita of 75.05 percent
of 1980 U.S. GDP per capita.136 If the tax rate were cut in half, modelpredicted GDP per capita as a fraction of U.S. GDP per capita drops to 53.42
percent. Thus, while an investment earning $100 at the higher productivity
rate would yield in $79.38 after-tax, the same investment at the lower
productivity rate would yield approximately five-sevenths the return on a
pre-tax basis, or $71.18. The after-tax return would be $63.28. A rational
investor would therefore favor investment in the high-tax jurisdiction.13 7

from Rich to Poor Countries?,80 AM.

EcoN. REv. 92 (1990). The Lucas Paradox is
more of a puzzle than it is a paradox. Lucas attempted to explain the fact that capital
flowed into the U.S. much more readily than into India in 1988, despite the fact that
theory predicted the marginal productivity of capital in India would be fifty-eight
times higher than in the U.S. Id. Lucas offered two possible explanations: differences
in "fundamentals," or country-specific factors affecting productivity, and market
failure.
Alfaro et al. examine a larger data set for the period 1971-2000 and
conclude that fundamentals are the key determinant. In particular, they state: "low
institutional quality is the leading explanation for the Lucas Paradox." Alfaro,
Capital Flow, supra note 133, at 347. The explanation offered in this Article is
consistent with Alfaro inasmuch as many fundamentals, including those affecting
institutional quality, tend to be financed with tax amenities.
135. In 1980, the U.S. tax rate (national and sub-national) as a percentage of
GDP per capita was 26.40 percent, of which 78.1 percent, or 20.62 percent of GDP,
was devoted to spending on tax amenities, defined as all tax outlays other than to
fund pensions (social security). Data on total taxes as a percentage of GDP and on
pension taxes as a percent of GDP, in each case for a range of years, is available
from the OECD http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV.
136. See Table 1.c., Line 7.
137. Other tax explanations for the Lucas Paradox have been offered. For
example, Kleinbard notes that the capacity of multinational firms to deflect income
economically earned in high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions for tax
purposes removes the added cost of investing in high-tax jurisdictions while
enabling the investor to reap the greater productivity benefits there. Kleinbard,
Stateless Income, supra note 32, at 770-71. Kleinbard's explanation is entirely
consistent with the theory of tax amenities offered here, since it presupposes that the
absolute pre-tax return to investment in high-tax jurisdictions is superior to that in
low-tax ones.
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Finally, there are dramatic welfare consequences to tax-induced
capital flows that have gone largely unnoticed in the literature. The link
between tax revenues and productivity means that the flow of capital in
response to taxes has a multiplier effect on increases in productivity in the
source and, at least in the case of territorial systems, on reductions in
productivity in the residence, disregarding the very real problem of tax
competition (addressed in Part V). For the source enjoying net capital
inflows, if statutory rates of tax remain constant (which they rarely do in a
territorial world) the news generally would be good regardless whether the
system is territorial or worldwide, as the source gets all the additional tax
revenue associated with the net inflow of capital. The additional tax revenue
improves the rate of return in the source, thereby making it more attractive
for additional investment. This virtuous circle continues until the
improvement in the rate of return is balanced by a reduction resulting from
the increased relative supply of capital in the source as a factor of
production.
By contrast, for a residence country experiencing net capital outflow,
the news is likely to be bad - especially in a territorial system. In a
territorial system, as capital leaves the residence, productivity declines
because of the decline in tax revenues. The decline in productivity makes the
residence still less attractive to capital, meaning that still more capital can be
expected to depart. The downward spiral continues until the increased
scarcity of capital relative to other factors of production in the residence
counterbalances any additional reduction in the rate of return to capital
resulting from reductions in tax revenues. The point at which equilibrium is
reached, however, is likely to be one at which productivity is markedly lower
than it would have been if tax revenues were kept at a level sufficient to
maintain capital productivity in the residence. Whether there is an overall
reduction in productivity - that is, a worldwide reduction - depends upon
the consequences in the source. It seems safe to say, however, that residence
reductions in productivity are less likely in a system of worldwide taxation,
as high-tax resident jurisdictions retain some tax revenue after the departure
of capital to lower-tax jurisdictions. Where the revenue retained is sufficient
to maintain productivity levels (as it may be given the reduced burden to
finance tax amenities resulting from the net departure of capital), no
downward spiral occurs.
V.

ALLOCATIVE, DISTRIBUTIONAL, AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS

Part III laid out the case against the traditional understanding of
international tax neutrality, arguing that the effects of capital flows on pretax rates of return render the idea that there exists a worldwide baseline
against which one can measure return problematic. Part IV developed a
model for thinking about cross-border taxation that takes account of the
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relationship between tax revenues and the pre-tax rate of return - the effect
of so-called tax amenities on productivity. Part IV also detailed some of the
productivity consequences of capital flows for home and host jurisdictions,
assuming that capital moves in response to taxes.
This Part briefly examines the circumstances under which such
capital flows are likely to occur in light of the model and compares
predictions of the model with observation. It also surveys the likely
allocative, distributional and competitive properties of international tax
systems under the model. If the case for pursuing some global form of
neutrality fails, these effects loom larger in any effort to develop policy
prescriptions for principles of international taxation.
A. After-Tax Returns

A range of average effective tax rates and levels of development
obtains in the actual world,13 8 but in broad brush the world consists mostly
of a set of industrialized, developed countries and a set of relatively nonindustrialized, undeveloped countries.139 Here I consider the situations of a
developed and an undeveloped country under alternative international tax
regimes as the world moves from closed to open economies, taking into
account that under any system, investors generally seek not to minimize their
effective tax rates, but to maximize their after-tax returns.
In general, the after-tax rate of return is given by:
q, = (1 - t)*r,

(2)

where q; is after-tax rate of return, t; is tax rate, and r, is pre-tax rate of return
(in each case expressed as decimals), all in Country i. In making investment
decisions, investors seek a combination of tax rate and rate of return that
provides the maximum value for q.
Many factors are responsible for r;, but for present purposes I bracket
all those except taxes and population, which Part IV suggests are highly
correlated with productivity. Using Equation (1'), it is possible to derive an
expression for r, in terms of t; and population for a world in which all taxes
138. See Heritage Foundation, 2011 Index of World Economic Freedom,
http://www.heritage.org/Index/download for a list of all countries and tax rates. It is
possible to compute tax revenue per capita using the Heritage Foundation data.
139. According to the World Bank, in 2010, of the 215 countries for which
data are available, more than one-half have gross national income (GNI) per capita
of less than one-half the worldwide average of $9,097. The populations of these
countries account for substantially more than one-half of world population. See
World Bank, Gross National Income Per Capita 2010, Atlas Method and PPP,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf
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are income taxes levied at a flat rate. Recall that Equation (1') relates pre-tax
rate of return (expressed as the ratio of GDP per capita to that of the U.S. in
1980) to amenity tax rate and country population (also as fractions of the
respective U.S. values for 1980) as follows:
GDP; = logn(T, + 1.2899)*logn(P,+ 2.9285). (1')
Taking population as fixed for any particular Country i, the second logarithm
term becomes a constant and for that country (1') simplifies to:
GDP = A,*logn(Ti + 1.2899),

(1")

where A; is the constant derived by applying the logarithm function to the
argument of the second logarithm term in Equation (1'), taking as P; the ratio
of Country i population to U.S. population in 1980.
If GDP per capita is taken as a proxy for pre-tax rate of return, then
one can rewrite r; as the product of GDP and some constant, K. However, it
is not necessary to derive K if one expresses the after-tax rate of return not
directly as a rate but as the ratio of the Country i GDP per capita to the same
reference GDP per capita that was used in Equation (1) (that is, U.S. GDP
per capita in 1980), multiplied by one minus the tax rate in Country i. (Under
this procedure, the K term drops out.)
Therefore, let Q, be the ratio of q, to qus-so, U.S. GDP per capita in
1980. Then:
(2')
Q, = (1 - t;)*Ri,
where R, is simply Country i productivity measured against 1980 U.S.
productivity, or the expression given on the right side of Equation (1'). For a
fixed population in Country i, that expression is given by Equation (1"), so
that:
R; = Ai*loga(T1 + 1.2899).
(1"')
Finally, since T is just the ratio of ti to the reference tax rate, U.S. amenity
taxes in 1980 (expressed as the ratio of all U.S. tax revenue to U.S. GDP for
the year), or 0.206, Equation (1') can be rewritten as:
Ri = Ai*logn((t/0.206) + 1.2899),

(1"")

and Equation (2') becomes:

Q,= (1 - t;)*Ai*log((t/O.206) + 1.2899).

(2")

Equation (2") relates the after-tax return in Country i to its average
amenity tax rate and population, the latter of which it treats as fixed for any
given country. For any population size, after-tax return reaches a maximum
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at a value for ti of approximately 0.34, or 34 percent,140 though what this
maximum value is depends slightly upon population.141 Table 2 provides
values at selected tax rates for a country having one-quarter the population of
the United States in 1980. For such a country, A is 1.156, and at t = .34, Q,
has a value of 0.633. In other words, the after-tax maximum rate of return in
Country i, assuming it is one-fourth the size of the U.S. in 1980 population,
is approximately 82.3 percent of the pre-tax rate of return in the U.S. in
1980, which translates into approximately 103.7 percent of the after-tax rate
of return in the U.S. in 1980.142 Table 2 shows that the "sweet spot" for
maximum after-tax returns runs from average effective tax rates of about 30
percent to about 40 percent, a range covering average tax rates (expressed as
the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP) in developed countries, not
developing countries. 143
Equation (2") suggests, contrary to the usual assumptions about the
effects of tax rates on investment, that as trade restrictions are lifted, capital
is more likely to flow into high-tax jurisdictions than into low-tax ones. The
evidence is consistent with this hypothesis.144 The vast majority of
international trade takes place among developed countries.145 Alfaro et al.,
summarizing data from the IMF and other sources, report that for a sample
consisting of 23 developed and 75 undeveloped countries over the period
1971 to 2000, capital inflows per capita to developed countries exceeded
those to undeveloped countries by a factor of approximately 5.146

140 The derivative of Equation (2") with respect to ti is:
dQi/dti = (1 - ti)*(Ai*4.854/(4.854*ti + 1.2899)) - Ai*logn(4.854*ti + 1.2899),
which reaches a value of zero when ti is approximately 0.340. The second-order
derivative is negative at this value of ti, indicating the value is a local maximum in
Equation (2").
141. Note that Equation (1') is much less sensitive to variations in
population size than tax rate.
142. Fraction of U.S. after-tax return in 1980 is given by the ratio to the
pre-tax return, divided by one minus the 1980 U.S. amenity tax rate (expressed as a
fraction), or 0.206. See supra note 135.
143. In 2008, the unweighted average effective tax rate for all OECD
countries was 34.8 percent. OECD Tax Database,
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3746,en 2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1 1,00.ht
ml#ARevenueStatistics (Table A). By contrast, the unweighted average effective
tax rate for all non-OECD countries in 2011 was 19.0 percent. The Heritage
Foundation, 2011 Index of Economic Freedom,
(macro-economic
http://www.heritage.org/index/Explore.aspx?view-by-variables
data, all countries).
144. Alfaro et al., CapitalFlow, supra note 133, at 352.

145. Id.
146. Id.
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Table 2: Selected Predicted After-Tax Rates of Return For a
Country Having 25 Percent of U.S. Population (1980)

0.1

After-tax return as
fraction of 1980
U.S. pre-tax return
0.597364416

After-tax return as
fraction of 1980 U.S.
after-tax return
75.23481315

0.2

0.754596793

95.03737951

0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9

0.817721901
0.813837148
0.759112991
0.664065935
0.535971298
0.380102232
0.200422488

102.9876450
102.4983814
95.60617013
83.63550823
67.50268242
47.87181768
25.24212698

Tax rate
(fraction)

The bias in favor of capital movements among developed countries
does not imply, of course, that there will be no capital flows from developed
to undeveloped countries; it implies only that those flows will be dwarfed by
flows among developed countries, as indeed they are. In general, the quantity
of capital inflows into developing countries appears to have grown steadily
over the last fifty years.14 7 In Alfaro's sample, from 1970 to 1974, net
inflows per capita to developing countries were less than $1,000 per year; in
the five-year period from 1990 to 1994, they had risen to approximately
$2,500 per year; and br 1995 they had more than doubled again, to more
than $5,000 per year. 48 Flows per capita into developed countries in
Alfaro's sample grew more quickly still, moving from approximately $1,000
per year in 1975-79 to more than $25,000 per year from 1995 to 2000.'14
B. Comparisons of Systemic Effects
1. TerritorialSystems

Even in a territorial system, investors will not automatically invest in
low-tax jurisdictions once borders are lifted, for the reason just discussed that
low taxes are highly correlated with lower productivity and lower after-tax
returns, and investors seek the highest after-tax return, not the lowest tax
rate.15 0 The relationship between tax rate and population on one hand and
147. Id.

148. Alfaro, CapitalFlow, supra note 133, at 352.
149. Id
150. See supra Part IV.
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productivity rate on the other illuminates the choices that countries face as
borders become more open. In a world of territorial tax systems, the opening
of borders would not be expected to result in massive net capital flows either
into or out of developed countries, as most trading will occur with similarly
situated partners and the tax advantages of low-tax jurisdictions would seem
to be dominated by productive weakness there. Rather, the uneven
distribution of resources, capabilities and factors of roduction worldwide
(commonly referred to as "comparative advantage" ) means that supranormal returns become available in all countries as borders are opened or,
stated otherwise, that new opportunities for gains from trade are as likely to
appear in one country as in another on a per capita basis. 152The
opportunities that emerge in developed countries, however, are more likely
to be attractive than those emerging in developing countries (because of the
higher productivity baseline). For a developed country, then, the optimal tax
policy would be simply to ensure that neither double taxation nor
opportunities for substantial tax avoidance materialize for investors. In the
case of trade between developed countries, a territorial system ought not
produce tax consequences much different from a worldwide system, as
investments should, on balance, be as likely to flow in as out, and, since rates
across developed jurisdictions are likely to be similar, forgone tax revenue
(on outbound investment) should approximately equal new tax revenue on
inbound investment.1 53
For a developing country, the situation is dramatically different.
Developing countries will have trouble attracting capital, since productivity
rates tend to be much lower. Lower productivity rates lead foreign investors
to discount investment opportunities offering supra-marginal returns (they
discount them, that is, relative to the value that host-country investors place
on those opportunities as compared with other opportunities in the host). In a
system of worldwide territorial taxation, developing countries theoretically
have two ways to deal with the resulting disincentive to inbound investment.
151. Paul A. Samuelson, Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm
Articles of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization, 18 J. EcoN. PERSP.
135 (2004).

152. See, e.g., id. for an analysis of comparative advantage in the
international setting. Samuelson notes that the comparative advantage story may be
too rosy in some settings, but he does not question the basic theory. See also Desai &
Hines, Evaluating Int'l Tax Reform, supra note 50, at 489.
153. See, e.g., Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 27, (noting that taxes should

have a minimal impact on choices between domestic and cross-border investment
where rates are comparable and opportunities for earnings stripping and other tax
avoidance strategies are unavailable); Shaviro, Tax-Electivity, supra note 3, at 39192 (noting that reciprocal territorial and reciprocal worldwide taxation involving two
countries "comes out exactly the same in the aggregate if the income amounts and
applicable tax rates are identical.").
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They can increase taxes in order to develop infrastructure and improve the
pre-tax rate of return, or they can cut taxes to reduce the after-tax cost of
investment more directly. Table 2 demonstrates why, if no other
considerations were in play, the former method ought to be vastly preferable.
Over the range of average tax rates running from 10 to 30 percent, a one
percent increase in average tax rates (measured as a fraction of GDP) is
associated with approximately a 0.75 percent increase, on average, in aftertax return.
The difficulty with raising rates to improve infrastructure, of course,
is that other considerations are in play. Higher rates do not directly translate
to higher productivity but promote it when governments make effective use
of tax revenues to build infrastructure - a time-consuming process.154
Where net capital exporters adopt territorial systems, developing countries
do not have the luxury of attracting capital by improving infrastructure with
the aid of higher rates, because the prospect of improved investment returns
materializing far in the future will not generally be attractive to investors
whose time horizons typically are much shorter. By contrast, lower tax rates
offer investors the opportunity for an immediately improved rate of return.
The result is a prisoner's dilemma among underdeveloped countries: the
option of competing on tax rates means that developing countries cannot
compete on tax amenities, because investors will move their capital to obtain
the more favorable after-tax return that is immediately available. From the
perspective of an individual developing country that seeks to attract foreign
capital, tax competition becomes the only rational strategy, but it leaves
developing countries as a group worse off than if all could cooperate to
increase rates.155 Instead of improved infrastructure leading to greater capital
investment (and still more improved infrastructure as taxes per capita rise),
the result is stagnating levels of development in countries that lacked
adequate infrastructure in the first place, as under-financed tax amenities
continue to go under-financed - another widely observed phenomenon.156
The overall picture that emerges is not pretty. On one hand,
developed countries as a group can expect to experience enhanced growth
compared with the closed-economy world they leave behind as borders
154. See Alfaro, CapitalFlow, supra note 133, at 353-54, for a statement

of the point as it relates to institutional quality (noting that the explanatory variables
of institutional quality "are slowly changing over time.").
155. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an extended discussion
of the prisoner's dilemma. Steven Kuhn, Prisoner's Dilemma, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma.
156. See, e.g., Eugene B. Gallagher, Sociological Studies of Third World
Health and Health Care: Introduction, 30 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 345, 345

(1989) ("[The 'Third
underdevelopment.").
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become more open and group members reap gains from trade. On the other
hand, developing countries that participate in the sweepstakes to attract
foreign capital are likely to be mostly unsuccessful and to remain relatively
infrastructure-poor to the extent they rely on international trade to fund
growth. And, because seeking foreign capital means keeping tax rates low or
lowering them compared with the rates they adopted in the system of closed
economies, they do in fact increase reliance on foreign investment to fund
growth. The result is that these countries all become less able to fund
infrastructure from native economic activity and, consequently, more
dependent on the vagaries of worldwide patterns of investment and trade to
fund tax amenities. In some cases - the most likely candidates would seem
to be developing countries that begin with relatively high tax revenues and
GDPs per capita and then seek to attract additional capital by lowering rates
- tax competition will prove ruinous and economic collapse will follow.
Again, these predictions are largely borne out by the facts. As
contrasted with growth in OECD countries, growth in developing countries
tends to be sporadic, volatile, and marked by periods of contraction. 157 Over
the long run, it is only about half as large as growth in developed
countries.1 58 The lesson for developing economies in a world of tax
competition would seem to be that it is better to stay out of the tax-driven
competition to attract capital entirely and rely instead on domestic
production and, perhaps, other sources of capital (such as foreign aid) to
develop infrastructure.
2.

Worldwide Systems

A universal worldwide system with a limited foreign tax credit
differs from a territorial system most significantly in that tax rate competition
over capital is largely eliminated. As economies become open, investors
continue to have the choice to invest in low-tax or high-tax jurisdictions, but
investors in capital exporting nations, who typically face high domestic rates,
will derive no tax advantage from investment in low-tax jurisdictions
because of the residual home-country tax liability on low-taxed foreign
earnings.
This point is well understood; 159 it is simply a feature of worldwide
systems. What has not been as widely appreciated is the generally salutary
relationship between the absence of tax competition and developing country
productivity. Developing countries compete for capital by offering the best
157. Lant Pritchett, Understanding Patterns of Economic Growth:
Searchingfor Hills Among Plateaus,Mountains, and Plains, 14 THE WORLD BANK
EcoN. REv. 221, 222 (2000).

158. Id. at 225.
159. See, e.g., Kleinbard,Stateless Income, supranote 32.
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after-tax return to foreign investors. In a territorial world, they theoretically
can compete by improving the pre-tax rate of return or by lowering the actual
tax rate. For the reasons explored in the last section, the former is superior
over the long run, but as a practical matter only the latter is available, leading
to a cycle of under-taxation and chronic underdevelopment. By contrast, in a
worldwide system, residual taxation by the home country makes direct
competition on rates impossible. Consequently, if states compete for foreign
capital, they can be expected to do so by competing to provide better tax
amenities, that is, by raising rates and improving infrastructure.
The residual character of an FTC system makes competition to
provide tax amenities particularly attractive to developing countries, because
it empowers home-country investors to finance the host-country fisc at the
expense of the home fisc, rather than of the home-country investors
themselves. That is, because home-country investors are reimbursed by the
home-country government via the FTC, foreign taxes paid by home residents
constitute a wealth transfer from home country to host country where the
party in control of the amount of the transfer does not bear its cost.
Consequently, host countries have access to a source of funding that is to
some extent free. In practice, both nondiscrimination rulesl60 and limits on
residence jurisdictions' FTC largessl61 prevent source rates on foreign
investors from going too high, but these limits merely blunt the effect; they
do not eliminate it, especially since host jurisdictions can return some of the
benefits of high rates on their own residents in the form of tax benefits or
even direct transfer payments.
From a worldwide welfare perspective, it is hard to see how this
incentive structure does not improve things, despite the apparent departure
from "neutrality" - namely, tax-induced changes on the pre-tax rate of
return in each jurisdiction. On one hand, as investment moves among
jurisdictions having comparable tax rates, tax revenues should generally rise
uniformly because of rising productivity or the reciprocal exploitation of
comparative advantage. And, on the other, as investment moves from
developed to developing countries, the siphoning of tax revenues to
developing countries improves rates of productivity there and may or may
not damage productivity in the home jurisdiction. (Recall that the effect on
160. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Oct. 29, 2004,
Art. 1-4, 2004 O.J. (C 310)(establishing the "four freedoms," which, together, have
been applied by the European Court of Justice to prevent member states of the EU
from engaging in income tax discrimination). See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discriminationand the Politicaland Economic Integration

of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1194 (2006). In addition, treaty nondiscrimination
provisions routinely require equal treatment of similarly situated citizens and foreign
nationals. See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of Nov. 15, 2006, art. 24(1).
161. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 904.
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home country productivity is ambiguous when both capital and some of the
associated tax revenue leave the jurisdiction, since some of the tax amenities
that the departing revenue finances were needed only to pay for amenities for
the capital that has now left.) Indeed, even if developing countries respond to
the opening of borders by raising their rates to the levels in developed
countries, so that all tax revenue associated with exported capital goes to the
developing country, worldwide productivity should increase, since the
benefit from a marginal dollar of tax revenue in a low-tax jurisdiction will
exceed the detriment from the loss of that dollar of tax revenue in the hightax jurisdiction.162
3.

Mixed Systems

The world, in fact, is populated mostly by jurisdictions that employ
some version of territoriality and a handful of jurisdictions that employ some
variant of worldwide taxation - the U.S. being the most prominent example
of the latter.163 A world of mixed regimes can change the calculation for any
individual jurisdiction about which system it should adopt. For example, as
discussed earlier, under standard neutrality models, a proponent of CON
should be indifferent between a world of worldwide taxation and one of
territorial taxation, because the relative prices of all investments will be the
same for all residents in every jurisdiction in either world.164 However, the
competitive or neutrality properties of pursuing a worldwide regime will not
necessarily be preserved if other countries are territorial, or vice-versa. 165
Also as previously discussed,166 under the standard mode of neutrality
analysis, residents of high-tax worldwide jurisdictions are at both an
ownership neutrality and a competitive disadvantage when compared with
residents of territorial jurisdictions. Further, if the most important
comparative advantage stemming from international trade derives from the
opportunity to allocate ownership to non-residents, the efficiency losses from
tax-induced ownership changes (or non-changes) for residents of high-tax

162. This result follows from the logarithmic property of Equation (1).
163. See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 27, (noting that territorial systems
are overwhelmingly used to tax foreign direct investment). In light of opportunities
for deferral and the use of disregarded entities, the U.S. system is more accurately
characterized as worldwide lite or even quasi-territorial than as a true worldwide
system. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 32, at 714-15 (describing the U.S.
system as an ersatz territorial system).
164. Hines, Reconsidering,supra note 19, at 276-77.
165. Id. at 277.

166. See supra Part II.B.3.
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worldwide jurisdictions are likely to be quite high given the ease with which
ownership can be transferred from one person to another.1 67
Most of these worries would appear to be overstated if the theory
offered here is accurate. The worry on competitive neutrality is that residents
of high-tax worldwide systems will be unable to compete with investors in
territorial jurisdictions for favorable investment opportunities in low-tax
jurisdictions.168 Tax competition among low-tax jurisdictions to attract
foreign capital then will exacerbate the problem. The story rests on the view,
implicitly ratified under the traditional mode of neutrality analysis, that
advantageous investment opportunities in low-tax jurisdictions are likely to
be prevalent as borders open because of the reduced tax burden there. Under
the tax amenity theory, it would seem that low-tax jurisdictions are unlikely
to offer many favorable investment opportunities for the same reason - the
reduced tax burden.169 And, as reported earlier in this Part, the evidence
seems to support the theory. Capital moving across borders overwhelmingly
flows into high-tax jurisdictions, not low-tax ones, even though most
jurisdictions employ territorial systems of one sort or another.
The story is similar even if the dominant margin along which
investors respond to cross-border tax incentives is ownership identity.
Nothing about the CON story suggests that if ownership identity in fact is
more tax-elastic and of greater import than the capital location or savings
margins, favorable investment opportunities are more likely to arise in lowtax jurisdictions. Productivity still seems to require substantial infrastructure,
a point that Desai and Hines themselves suggest:
[M]odern scholars view [foreign direct investment, or FDI] as
arising from differential capabilities, and consequently differential
productivity, among firms, and the extension of intangible assets
across borders. This intuition squares well with empirical FDI
patterns, which include the fact that most of the world's FDI
represents investment from one high-income country into another,
and the fact that a very high fraction of such investment takes the
form of acquiring existing businesses.1 70
Desai and Hines frame their observation in terms of the movement of
investment among high-income rather than high-tax jurisdictions, but the
correlation between incomes and taxation is, as noted previously, itself quite

167. Desai & Hines, EvaluatingInt'l Tax Reform, supra note 50, at 491-92
(noting the sensitivity of ownership to tax consideratons).

168. Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 27.
169. Id. at 72.
170. Desai & Hines, Old Rules, supra note 4, at 956.
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high. Apart from tax havens, there are not many high-income jurisdictions
that do not have high taxes. 17 1
VI. CONCLUSION

Taking their cue from the theory of neutrality as developed in the
domestic setting, the traditional modes of analyzing international tax
neutrality downplay or disregard the link between tax revenues and
productivity. Such a procedure has a surface plausibility in the domestic
setting, where the connection between tax revenues and the provision of
identifiable benefits can be disregarded by assuming that a revenue target
implicitly associated with some level of productivity is exogenously set. Part
III.C. discussed why the approach is theoretically unsatisfactory, but the
objections raised there do not make the effort to model neutrality for closed
economies in lump-sum terms an entirely unhelpful exercise.
The procedure is not available even as a theoretical ideal in the
international setting, where tax rules inevitably affect both the magnitude of
tax revenues and the identities of their recipients. In the international setting,
the only way to make sense of the pre-tax rate of return is to suppose that
states begin from a world of closed economies and then move to more open
ones. But tax and non-tax investment incentives that arise as that movement
takes place redirect tax revenues and alter the burdens on infrastructure, each
of which phenomena is alone sufficient to cause the revenue raised to
diverge from the exogenously set target and thereby to affect the quantity of
tax amenities needed to maintain productivity at the originally chosen rate.
Over time, as tax amenities exceed or fall short of the requisite amount, the
rate of return that was supposed to be taken as the baseline against which to
measure the distorting effects of tax rules is adjusted. As a result, what
appeared to be a baseline turns out to be no baseline at all. In a final twist,
the alterations themselves may well be productivity- and even efficiencyenhancing, even though they are "tax-motivated." Where, for example, tax
rules encourage low-productivity, low-tax source jurisdictions to compete on
the supply of tax amenities (rather than on tax rate), the net effect over time
would seem to be (at worst) a slight lowering of productivity in high-tax
residence jurisdictions and a much larger increase in the productivity of the
sources. On a worldwide basis, that would count as tax-motivated capital
shifts leading to arrangements that are welfare-enhancing, not welfarereducing.
One inference that may be drawn from these observations is that a
more fruitful lens than neutrality through which to view the effects of
international tax rules is the competitive, allocative, and distributional
properties of various possible tax regimes. From a global welfare
171. See supra Part IV.
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perspective, the object of designing a tax regime is not to maximize
neutrality but to promote overall welfare, which may require promoting tax
"distortions" that improve total productivity.
A second inference is that sensitivity to the relationship between tax
revenue and productivity suggests that the consequences of adopting various
possible methods of double tax relief are likely to be quite different from
those assumed under the traditional view. In particular, worldwide regimes
are more likely than territorial regimes to promote welfare-enhancing
improvements to infrastructure in low-tax jurisdictions. By contrast,
territorial taxation tends to promote harmful tax competition among
developing countries while yielding little competitive or savings benefit to
high-tax jurisdictions.
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APPENDIX

Data for the regression in Equation (1):
Y = ln(pl+xl)*ln(p2 + x2), where:
country population in 1980 as fraction of U.S. 1980 population.
country tax revenue in 1980 as percentage U.S. tax revenue 1980,
backing out all social security contributions.
xl, x2: parameters derived by the regression.
Y:
Predicted GDP per capita as a fraction of U.S. GDP per capita, 1980.
pl:
p2:

Countrv*
Australia
Austria

Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece

pl
0.0643 0.9621
0.0332 1.1771

Y

0.8350
0.9191
0.0433 1.1685 0.8925
0.1082 0.9807 0.9591
0.0225 1.7977 1.2836
0.0210 0.8249 0.8514
0.2425 0.8207 0.9032
0.2713
0.0416

1.0417

0.9105

0.0444 0.5374
Ireland
0.0150 0.4406 0.6190
Italy
0.2484 0.2869 0.7960
Japan
0.5141 0.5188 0.7947
Korea
0.1678 0.0888 0.1685
Mexico
0.3008 0.1332 0.2382
Netherlands 0.0622 1.3235 0.9602
New
Zealand
0.0140 0.7253 0.6463
Norway
0.0180 1.6240 1.4941
Portugal
0.0430 0.0560 0.3748
Spain
0.1650 0.1302 0.5679
Sweden
0.0366 1.6330 0.9717
Turkey
0.1983 0.0564 0.1021
United
Kingdom
0.2478 0.8674 0.8299
United
States
1.0000 0.7810 1.0000

YcLo
0.8145
0.8911
0.8914
0.8359
1.0915
0.7402
0.7960
0.9116
0.2016
0.5247
0.4388
0.6568
0.2518
0.4136 -0.1754 0.0531 0.3033
1.0524 -0.0922 0.0467 0.9553

Y-yc SEest
0.8899 -0.0549 0.0363
0.9805 -0.0614 0.0430
0.9797 -0.0872 0.0425
0.9109 0.0482 0.0361
1.2200 0.0636 0.0618
0.8101 0.0413 0.0336
0.8620 0.0412 0.0318
0.9847 -0.0742 0.0351
0.3139 0.2235 0.0540
0.5920 0.0270 0.0324
0.5264 0.2696 0.0421
0.7326 0.0621 0.0365
0.3629 -0.1944 0.0535

0.7562
1.1557
0.3235
0.3961
1.1658
0.3390

-0.1099
0.3384
0.0513
0.1718
-0.1941
-0.2369

0.0319
0.0569
0.0531
0.0502
0.0567
0.0568

YcHi

0.9654
1.0699

1.0681
0.9859
1.3486
0.8800
0.9281

1.0577
0.4263
0.6594

0.6139
0.8084
0.4741

0.5240
1.1496

0.6899
1.0373
0.2131
0.2916

0.8225
1.2741
0.4339
0.5005
1.0480 1.2836
0.2208 0.4571

0.8886 -0.0587 0.0323

0.8214 0.9558

0.9961

0.9243

0.0039 0.0345

1.0678

